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New features of the  present study on the long-term energy outlook are, firstly, that 
it is  not confined exclusively to the Europe of the Six but covers the wider field of the 
world energy economy, secondly, that it  carries up  to around  1980  the forecasts for the 
period 1970-75 worked out in  1960-62, and thirdly, that fuller account is taken than could 
be  done in  1960  of the new element in  the situation represented by  Dutch natural gas, 
then only just beginning to be opened up, and a more accurate calculation offered of the 
probable share of  nuclear power. 
The basic underlying assumption and the method employed, however, are the same 
as before.  The assumption is  that of an expanding European economy. The method of 
forecasting is  one which has done good service. Though known, it was little used at that 
time,  and  there was  some  doubt  as  to  its  suitability  for  this  particular  purpose.  But. 
applied,  subject to all  possible safeguards and with the utmost caution observed in the 
interpretation of data and the allowing of margins of uncertainty, it produced forecasts 
which subsequently proved correct. 
Nevertheless, there remain two major question-marks, both arising out of the quick-
ening  pace  of discovery.  The present study was  on  the  point of completion when  the 
strikes of gas in  the  North Sea and the signs of coming big technological changes in the 
use of nuclear power brought further alterations in the general picture of Europe's future 
energy situation. We therefore offer it simply as a contribution to thought on the subject, 
commenting on current developments and outlining the prospects for  1970 and trends up 
to 1980. 
The great  point  which  emerges from  the study is  Europe's future  dependence on 
outside sources for its energy supplies. The extent of that dependence will vary according 
to the steps taken by the different countries to meet the situation and to the size of such 
energy  resources  as  may  be  discovered  within  their territories.  Rightly,  the E.C.S.C. 
Council of Ministers has  decided to commission a special investigation into the position 
as regards security of supply for Europe. 
Coal, which did, unaided, afford it that security for over a century, is now, for various 
reasons, losing ground faster than we  had foreseen.  What were still  regarded, when the 
previous study was drawn up, as coal's strongholds-the services sector, small industry, 
private households-are weakening steadily. It is  open to question whether the thermal 
power-stations will  continue as  one of coal's big  outlets when more and more of them 
are going  over to oil.  And that leaves the  iron and steel  industry-which  incidentally 
consumes only one type of coal, coking coal. The present study is an effort to cover these 
considerations, whose grave implications of social hardship and difficult regional adjust-
ment require long-term measures carefully thought out in advance. 
If thanks to the opening-up of the new resources to which I have referred we achieve 
security of supply and cheaper indigenous  Community energy, the already diminishing 
use being made of  our coal could well shrink more drastically still. 
3 On the other hand, the energy requirements of an expanding economy may by the 
closing years of the  century have reached such proportions  that all  available fuels,  in-
cluding  the oldest and  most costly,  will  have  to  be  thrown  in  to  meet the staggering 
demand. 
Like its predecessor, the present study is at pains not to suggest that events are bound 
to move in accordance with an inexorable destiny. On the contrary, it seeks by impartial 
analysis to cast light on what lies ahead in order to make it possible to influence develop-
ments.  It is  intended as an instrument to enable the industries, the Communities and the 
Governments to take appropriate action in time. 
Action: the man of action is the man who refuses to be the plaything of supposedly 
"inevitable" forces, and acts.  But he has to know what he is doing. To thos1! at the head 
of European energy affairs, at grips with grave problems and working to reso:lve them, the 
Executives of E.C.S.C., E.E.C. and Euratom ask only to provide in this study the basis 
of  technical data to serve as the foundation for their decisions. 
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6 INTRODUCTION 
The Study on the Long-term Energy Outlook for the European Community (referred 
to as the "Outlook" in  this document) was originally written in  1961  and 1962, issued in 
preliminary form in  December 1962  and published in its final, complete version in 1964. 
The authors feel  that a  review is  now needed to include the most recent information on 
the subject and to allow for developments in  the energy sector over the last four years. 
The opportunity will also be used to carry forecasts further into the future. 
The term  "review" clearly  indicates  the extension of an existing study and not a 
completely fresh report. The general concepts are the same, as far as possible comparable 
statistics are used and arguments which retain their full force are referred to rather than 
repeated. 
There are three parts comprising: 
a short survey of recent developments; 
a study of  conditions for balance in 1970; 
a brief review of supply and demand trends up to 1980. 
Although the current position is  systematically discussed in  a  detailed publication 
("La  Conjoncture  energetique  de Ia  Communaute")  it  was  felt  that a  comparison of 
recent developments with the "Outlook" indicating where and how far the present situa-
tion can be regarded as temporary, might form a useful introduction to a study of medium 
and long terms prospects. 
For the future,  1970  and  1980  should be  regarded  as landmarks only; we have no 
intention of trying to forecast exactly what will  be happening then and will confine our-
selves to discussing what the energy position may be like in a few years, in 1970 and later 
around 1980. 
Two dates have  been chosen because the problems to be faced and the means of 
dealing  with them will be quite different.  Production and consumption capacity in 1970 
are determined by decisions which have already been taken to a very large extent and can 
only  be  slightly  affected  by additions or alterations; consequently, scope for action  is 
limited to the economic conditions under which energy products are marketed. 1980 offers 
a much wider horizon, however, and action is possible in  most directions. As will appear 
from  this  report, decisions to be taken in the near future will be quite different for the 
two dates; around 1970, the·main concern will be to find outlets for coal but the longer-
term problem will be optimum coverage of  requirements. 
The two dates must be considered together in order to prepare energy policy. Deci-
sions aiming at a  balance around 1970  will  have long-term as well as immediate effects 
and steps must be taken here and now to ensure the desired pattern in 1980. 
Finally, it  must be  made quite clear that this  report merely sets out the results of 
technical and economic studies.  Conclusions regarding policies are, or will  be, reached 
in other documents. 
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RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS 
The Community energy market is  at present characterised by a  sharp  increase  in 
demand, abundant supplies and marked cost differences between the various sources of 
supply.  Even allowing for Government restrictions, the supply pattern is  being radically 
changed as a result. 
Three outstanding features will be discussed in detail: 
Consumption of hydrocarbons has increased rapidly while Community coal has fallen 
back, both absolutely and relatively.  In consequence, the share of imported energy in 
total supplies is rising. 
The main cause of this trend is  the price differential between the various competing 
sources of energy, combined with the greater convenience of using liquid and gaseous 
fuels. 
The measures  taken  by  a number of countries since  1958 to assist Community coal 
have  radically  distorted the relationship between the delivered-price and cost struc-
tures of the various forms  of energy.  Protection in  the shape of import restrictions 
and internal taxes have so far been relatively effective against American coal but, in 
the  case of petroleum products,  have  been gradually offset by  differences  between 
the  untaxed  prices  for Community coal and those of oil  products. This  has led  to 
further subsidies which have failed to prevent a  steady deterioration in the financial 
position of Community pits. 
Section  I 
Changes in the pattern of energy consumption 
As expected, the economic expansion of the Community has slowed down somewhat 
since  1960,  with  GNP rising  by  about  5% between  1960  and  1965  as  compared with 
5·5%  over  the  previous  ten  years.  Total  enerf.{y  consumption  in  the  Community  has 
nevertheless gone on  rising by  an  average of about 5%  per annum.  Over the  last five 
years  demand has increased a  little  more  quickly  than  was  forecast  in  the  "Outlook", 
with a  difference of around 3·5% after correction of the relevant series of statistics. As 
appears from  Table  1,  the increase has  not been regular, the very high  consumption of 
1962 and 1963 being due to the weather. 
For at least ten years, and particularly since  1958, consumption of petroleum prod-
ucts have risen steeply, with far-reaching effects on the pattern of consumption. Over the 
last five years, the share of hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) in the total has risen from 
31% to 49%, while that of coal has dropped from 53% to 38%. 
At the same time, imported energy's share in consumption has increased very sharply 
from 27% to 46%.  While consumption has risen by 135 million m. tons h.c.e., Community 
energy output has fallen in absolute figures (alomost 15 million m. tons h.c.e.). 
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TABLE J 
Coverage of  the Community's internal energy requirements 
'000,000 m. tons h.c.e.  %oftotal 
1950  11960(•) 1  1%2  I 19631  1964  11~  1950  ll%0(•) I 1965 
Total energy consumption  289  461  515  561  572  596  100  100  100 
of  which hard coal  213  245  249  254  237  224  74  53  38 
brown coal  25  34  36  37  38  34  9  7  6 
oil  30  126  175  207  240  270  10  28  45 
natural gas  1  14  18  19  20  23  ..  3  4 
hydro,  geothermal 
and nuclear energy(  c)  20  42  37  44  37  45  7  9  7 
Coverage by : 
a)  Community  energy  (257)  336  322  (89)  73  54 
of which hard coal  (215)  236  201  (74)  51  34 
b)  Imported energy (b)  (32)  125  274  (11)  27  46 
Source: High Authority energy balance-sheets. 
General notes:  I)  From 1964 onwards the statistics include consumption in West Berlin. 
2) The figures do not include oil used in the manufacture of non-energy products. 
Special notes:  a) figures revised as compared with the --outlook". 
b) less energy exports. 
c) including net imports. 
In particular, outlets for Community coal have not increased but have rather tended 
to decline.  Disposal difficulties which caused stocks to rise in  1958/59, were less in  1960 
because the economy was running at a very high level. The problem was concealed by 
the  very  cold weather in  1962  and  1963  but reappeared in  1964 and became serious in 
1965  when more than ten million metric tons were added to stocks during thf: year. Thus, 
despite coal production being cut from  234  million metric tons in  1960 to 218  million in 
1965 (1), the full Community output was only disposed of  when demand for energy was at a 
peak. 
The main features of the last five  years have, therefore, been the structura1 decline 
and cyclical vulnerability of Community coal, the rapid structural advance of petroleum 
products and their relative immunity to cyclical movements (at least as regards quantities) 
and a marked increase in imported energy's share of the market. 
A  more  detailed  picture is  given  by  the figures for the main consumer sectors (Ta-
ble 2 A). 
(1) National statistics in million m. tons h.c.e. =  1960- 229; 1965-21 L 
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TABLE 2 
A - Consumption by sectors 
'000,000 m. tons h.c.e. (rounded figures) 
Total energy  Oil 
Coal, Hard 
coal and coke 
1960  I 
1%5  1960 I 
1965  1960 I 
1965 
1. Iron and steel (1)  57  61  5  10  54  51 
of  which coke  (51)  (49) 
2. Other industries (1)  91  115  32  69  39  25 
3. Transport (1)  54  77  41  69  13  6.5 
4. Domestic sector (1)  100  139  29  67  53  50,5 
5. Electricity generation : 
of  which hydro and nuclear power 
stations (5)  42  45  - - - -
thermal power stations  75  107  6  24  46  55 
6. Other energy producers and 
converters (1)  (2)  37  44  13  28  36(4)  33(4) 
7. Miscellaneous (1)  5  8  - 3  4  4 
8. Total internal consumption  1  461  1  5%  1  126  1  210  1 245  1 225 
8 - Overall balance sheet 
1. Total internal consumption  461  5%  126 
2. Exports and bunkers  60  77  50 
3. Non-energy products  11  27  11 
4. Changes in stocks with converters and 
-0.4 -1  final consumers  -
5. Total disposals  531  699  187 
6. Imports  201  387  176 
7. Primary Community production  329  332  16 
8. Changes in producers' stocks  ~  6.51  +10.91  - 9. Final difference (4)  +5  +8  +5 
Soun·e: High Authority energy balance-sheet. 
(1)  Excluding electricity. 
(2)  Calculated as a remainder for total energy. 
(3)  Losses and· coke ovens, gasworks' charges, own consumption of  pits, coke ovens and gasworks. 
(~)  Line 9 = Line 6 + 7 - S  - 8. 
(II)  Primary energy equivalent of hydro and nuclear  electricity. 
'000,000 m. tons h.c.e. 
270  245  225 
71  8  5.5 
26  - -
- -0.4 -1 
I  367  1  253  I  230 
I 
350  I~ I 
29 
25  211 
l+s 
,_  6.5, +  11.5 
- -1 
II I:..'NERG"Y  OUTLOOK 
The amount of coal used directly for rail transport started to decline as long ago as 
1952,  when  diesel  and  electric  traction were  introduced;  this  trend  is  still  continuing 
rapidly in  the Federal  Republic of Germany but is  partially offset by the use of coal to 
generate electricity. 
There are two special  points to note concerning industries other than iron and steel. 
Over the last few years eaergy savings have been less marked and demand ha:i risen more 
than expected. At the same time, hydrocarbons which began to enter this sector in 1957/58 
are continuing to do so very rapidly. They are now being used both to generate steam and 
to heat furnaces and are even extending to branches such as cement-making, traditionally 
one of coal's preserves.  As a result, coal consumption has fallen particularly sharply in 
recent  years,  with  a  drop  of one third  in  five  years.  The decline  has  even continued 
during "peak" periods of  energy demand. 
In the iron and steel industry, the outstanding feature is the stagnation of demand for 
coke since 1961, as the combined result of  a slower increase in output and an unexpectedly 
rapid fall in blast-furnace input rates. 
Energy  requirements  for  the  consumer sector,  services  and small industry are still 
rising  rapidly  with  the  growth  of incomes and household expenditure over the last few 
years. The "Outlook's" assumption that demand would gradually be saturated does not 
appear to be proving accurate. In the case of coal there were wide fluctuations until  1964, 
reflecting temperature variations from year to year, but the average level of consumption 
was  little  affected;  however, the  estimates for  1965  suggest a  decline which cannot be 
accounted for by cyclical factors and may mark the start of  a new trend. 
Power stations form the last main sector, where two trends are to be noted : 
expansion  of conventional  thermal  production,  owing  to  the  relative  stagnation  of 
hydro-generation and delays in getting nuclear production under way. 
increased outlets for coal (over 20% in 5 years for all power stations), in marked con-
trast to the trend in  other sectors.  Although  the authorities in  some countires have 
encouraged the use of coal, liquid fuels account for 23% of the total input of  Communi-
ty  power stations, with wide variations from country to country (Italy 78%, Nether-
lands 41%, Belgium 28%, France 20% and Germany 9%). 
Some conclusions now emerge regarding the validity of the general trends outlined 
in the "Outlook": 
1.  Some  energy  requirements  were  under-estimated  (other  industries,  transport  and 
domestic sector) and others over-estimated (iron and steel), The net resul': is a higher 
figure for total requirements. 
2.  Far from  slowing down, the tendency for coal outlets to contract has become more 
marked. Apart from thermal power stations, all the main outlets have been affected in 
turn, leading to difficulties in disposing of Community coal output. 
There are several reasons for these difficulties : 
stagnation of the demand for coke from the iron and steel industry since 196l; 
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economic growth and the increase in energy requirements have been relatively slower 
in regions close to coalfiels than over the rest of  the Community; 
differences between retail coal prices and those of competing products, and particu-
larly petroleum products. Except in France and Italy, natural gas has so far had only 
a limited effect; 
at equal  delivered  price  per calorie,  many  coal  consumers have changed to other 
products for reasons of  convenience or quality. 
With the growing concentration of coal outlets on thermal power stations, the third 
factor  - relative  prices - will  in  future be by far the  most important.  Special  attention 
should, therefore, be given to existing price and cost relationships. 
Section 2 
Changes in relative prices of  energy products 
As a result of  the changing supply pattern outlined above, oil prices have increasingly 
become the reference prices for the whole Community energy market outside the iron and 
steel industry. 
The rapidly expanding markets of the Community were the first to reflect the falling 
trend of world prices for petroleum products. Heavy fuel oil prices reached rock-bottom 
as long ago as 1960 (Table 3) and have stayed at much the same level ever since. 
I 
Prices for middle distillates have fallen by 20 to 30% since the spring of 1964, due to 
changes in supply conditions following the arrival of Libyan crude with a high gasoil yield, 
the equipment of refineries with units giving higher gasoil yiels and competition from the 
first deliveries of  natural gas in the Netherlands. 
Inland tariffs for natural gas in  the Netherlands suggest prices of about $ 12  to  J3 
per ton  h.c.e.  for large  industrial consumers and $20 to 23  per ton h.c.e. for domestic 
heating. 
The current price situation can therefore be summarised as follows: 
$ 11  to 15 per ton h.c.e., inclusive of all taxes, for heavy fuel oil and natural gas for indus-
trial use, with differences in national tax accounting for the range. Except in  France, the 
corresponding untaxed prices range from$ 8 to$ 10 per ton h.c.e. 
$ 20 to 25  per ton h.c.e. for household fuels (except light fuel oil in  Belgium where recent 
tax measures have raised the price to about $ 30 per ton h.c.e.). 
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TABLE 3 
Trends in fuel-oil prices at a number of Community centres (  1) 
Year 
Date (summer-autumn rates) 
I.  Heavyji1el oil 
(large industrial consumers) 
- Hamburg  November 1960 
(delivered  November 1964 
price)  December 1965 
- Rotterdam  November 1960 
(delivered  November 1964 
price)  December 1965 
.January 1966 
- Antwerp  November 1960 
(ex-refinery)  Nov  mber 1964 
December 1965 
.January 1966 ( 4) 
- Dunkirk- November 1960 
Le Havre  November 1964 
(ex-refinery)  December 1965 
- Genoa  November 1960 
(ex-refinery)  November 1964 
December 1965 
II.  Light.fi1el oil (delivered price) 
(domestic heating) 
- Hamburg  November 1963 
November 1964 
December 1965 
- Rotterdam  November 1963 
November 1964 
Decernber 1965 
.January 1966 
- Antwerp  November 1963 
November 1964 
December 1965 
January 1966 
- Dunkirk- November 1963 
Le Havre  November 1964 
December 1965 
- Milan  November 1963 
November 1964 
(tluido) (2)  December 1965 
Source: ''La conjoncture energetique", several years. 
($per metric ton) 
Price perm. ton  Price p•:r m. ton 
of fuel oil  h.;:.e. 
I 
lnd"d;ng I  He fore  lnd"d;ng I  Before;  Tax 
all taxes  tax  all taxes  tax 
17.0-20.0  6.0  11.0-14.0  11.9-14.0  7.7- 9.8 
19.0-21.0  7.7  11.3-12.3  13.3-14.0  7.9- 8.6 
20.0-21.0  7.7  12.3-13.3  14.0-14.7  8.6- 9.3 
13.5-15.0  1.0  12.5-14,0  9.4-10.5  8.7- 9.8 
16.5-17.0  3.0  13.5-14.0  11.5-11.9  9.4- 9.8 
16.0-18.0  3.0  13.0-15.0  11.2-12,6  9.1-10.5 
18.0-20.0  5.0  13.0-15.0  12.6-14.0  9.1-10.5 
20.0-24.0  6.0  14.0-18.0  14.0-16.8  9.8-12.6 
16.0-17.0  4.5  11.5-12.5  11.2-11.9  8.0- 8.7 
15.5-16,5  4.5  11.0-12.0  10,8-11.5  7.7- 8.4 
15.5-16.5  4.5  11.0-12.0  10.8-11.5  7.7- 8.4 
22.5-23.5  2.2  20.3-21.3  15,7-16.5  14.2-14.9 
19.0-20.5  2.2  16.8-18.3  13.3-14.3  11.7-12.8 
18.0-19.0  2.2  15.8-16.8  12.6-13.3  11.0-11.7 
17.0-18.0  5.0  12.0-13.0  11.9-12.6  8.4- 9.1 
16.0-17.5  5.0  11.0-12.5  11.2-12.2  7.7- 8.7 
16.5-18.0  5.0  11.5-13.0  11.5-12.6  8,0- 9.1 
36.3-39.2  3.3  33.0-35.8  25.4-27.3  23.1-25.0 
28.2-31.1  3.3  24.9-27.8  19.7-21.7  17.4-19.4 
28.0-30.0  3.3  24.7-26.7  19.6-21.0  17.3-18.7 
40.9  0-1.0  39,9-40.9  28,6  27.9-28.6 
28.0-31.0  0-1.0  27.0-31.0  19.5-21.7  18,9-21.7 (3 
25.0-28.0  0-1.0  24.0-28.0  17.5-19.6  16.8-13.7 
26.0-29.0  0-1.0  25.0-29.0  18.2-20.3  17.5-20.3 
38.0-40.3  6.0  32.0-34.3  26.6-28.2  22.4-24.0 
31,0-33.0  5.5  25.5-27.5  21.7-23.1  17.8-19.2 
31.0-35,0  5.5  25.5-29.5  21.7-24.5  17.8-20.6 
42.0-46.0  16-17  26.0-29.0  29.4-32.2  18.2-20.3 
40,3  3.5  36,8  28,2  25.7 
35.0-37.5  3.1  31.9-34.4  24.6-26.2  22.3-24.1 
32.0-35.0  3.1  28.9-31.9  22.4-24.5  20.2-22.3 
29.3  7.0  22.3  20.5  15.6 
29.0  7.2  21.8  20.3  15.2 
25.0-26.0  7.2  17.8-18.8  17.5-18.2  12.4-13.1 
(') Real  prices of fuel oils are not  ~nown for certain because of the rebates allowed. The above figures are based on incomplete data; 
they are not fully comparable, either from year to ye«r or between countries and only represent general trends. 
(2}  Fuel fluido (3° -SO Englerl is heavier than the household or light fuel oil used in the other countries. 
(
3
}  Private domestic use; the duty on oil for other u'es was about$ 6 up  till  1.1.66 and is  now$ 10.  Price is  increased by the additiona:' 
duty. 
(4 }  Following the duty increase of 1.1.66. 
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Lastly, prices have varied Jess on the motor-spirit market which is difficult and costly 
to enter. Prices at the pump have fallen only slightly and are still adequate for the integra-
ted companies which have been working this market for many years. On the other hand, 
much higher rebates have had to be offered on wholesale contracts. 
In the case of American coal, the c.i.f. price for tonnages freighted on a single voyage 
has risen by about $ I since 1960 and, before customs duty, now stands at approximately 
$ 12.50 for steam coal and$ 14.50 for coking fines (Table 4). The trend for single voyages 
is  not reflected, however, in the post for bulk cargoes carried by large vessels. This price 
has fallen below the spot rate and must be something like$ 13 for coking coal and $ 11 for 
steam coal.  American coal,  before duty, can therefore compete with  heavy fuel  oil  (tax 
paid) in coastal areas but not inland because of the additional cost of transport. 
TABLE4 
Price of American coal freighted on a single voyage basis 
Year (autumn rate) 
1%0 
1%3 
1%4 
1%5 
Price f.o.b. 
9.60 
10.41 
10.41 
10.47 
(Smalls and coking  .fines,$ per metric ton) 
Atlantic  I  Price 
freight charge  c.i.f. A.R.A. 
3.51 
5.01 
3.76 
4.04 
13.11 
15.42 
14.17 
14.51 
Schedule pithead prices for the Community coal industry vary from field to field as 
follows: 
$ 15 to 17 for industrial steam coal and coking fines 
$ 30 to 34 for anthracite (Belgium $ 42). 
Because transport costs tor coal  are relatively high, price differences between Com-
munity coal and competing products rise sharply as distance from the coalfield increases. 
Alignment on competing  rices is costly and is applied to limited tonnages only. 
A.s  will  be  seen in Section 3, absolute cost differences between the various forms of 
energy are much bigger than price differences, but cost trends continue to influence price 
movements. The price of heavy fuel oils has been kept down while light fuel prices have 
been cut by higher productivity throughout production and distribution. 
Yields have also been substantially increased in  several coalfields. The forecasts for 
Germany and  Lorraine in  the "Outlook" have been exceeded, but progress has slowed 
down considerably in  the last year or so  (Table 5 A).  Wages  have moved in a different 
direction, with an average rise of 6.5 to 8.5% per annum (1) over the last five years and the 
sharpest increases during the last two or three (Table 5 B). The combined effect of these 
changes has been a marked, general increase in pit production costs despite ihe fact  i:hat 
Governments have assumed responsibility for special social security payments. Over the 
five-year period, the rise exceeded 10% in the Federal Republic of Germany, 15% in Bel-
Pium, 25% in France and the Netherlands. 
(1) These remarks refer to nominal wages. With the general price rise in  the Community the increase in real wages 
has been much less. 
15 Coalfield 
Ruhr 
Saar 
Campine 
Southern Belgium 
Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Lorraine 
Dutch Limburg 
Country 
ermany (Fed. Rep.)  G 
B  elgium 
france 
N etherlands 
( 1)  Provisional. 
1960 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
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TABLE 5 
A.  Trend in o.m.s. in the coalmines 
O.m.s. kg. for kg. 
Actual  Estimate 
l 
in 1%5 
1960  1965  Outlook" 
2.181  2,895  2,700 
2.013  2,740  2,700 
1;778  2,102  2,350 
1A52  1.697  1,760 
1,562  1,662  1,680 
2,580  3,239  2,850 
1,833  2,253  2,240 
B.  Trend in average direct hourly wages 
(underground and surface) 
Index 1%0 = 100 
Actual  "Outlook" 
1965 
I  1963  I  1964  I  1965(1)  (')  I  (3) 
128.0  135.7  149.3  122.9  144.9 
119.1  127.3  137.5  117.1  136.9 
123.8  134.5  143.0  121.7  146.8 
122.3  140.0  150.6  114.8  140.5 
( 2)  Estimates at constant general level of prices. 
(3)  Estimates allowing for changes in general level of prices. 
C.  Trend in companies' production costs 
Country  1960  1961  1962  1963 
Germany (Fed. Rep.)  100.0  103.1  103.1  104.3 
Belgium  100.0  97.2  99.9  104.4 
France  100.0  108.1  112.9  127.1 {1) 
Netherlands  100.0  99.0  108.3  113.9 
(a)  Estimated. 
(b)  Including effects of strikes, 
16 
-
Average annuc I increase 
1%0-1965 
-
Actual  I 
"Outlook" 
-
% 
5.8  4.3 
6.4  5.6 
3.3  5.5 
3.2  4.1 
1.2  1.5 
4.6  2.0 
4.2  4.1 
-
Average annual increase 
1960- 1%5 
"Outlook" 
Actual  % 
:')  I 
(•) 
8.1  4.2  7.7 
6.6  3.2  6.5 
7.4  4.0  8.0 
8.4  2.8  7.0 
(Basis: national currency) 
1964  1965 
106.2  112.8 
111.6  116.0 
120.5  127.7 
122.2  127.0 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
As a  result, price cuts introduced some years ago by certain coalfields either could 
not be maintained or have only been continued with increased assistance. 
To sum up: 
there is  a  widening gap between prices of Community coal and those of competing 
forms  of energy, with the result that disposals fell  off immediately after the "peak" 
demand of 1962 and 1963 disappeared; 
the collieries' financial position is becoming worse; 
further aid is needed if output is to be marketed. 
Section  3 
Effects of protection and subsidies 
The changes described would have been swifter still  if the authorities in coal-pro-
ducing countries had not taken a whole series of measures which can be summarised as 
follows: 
Imported coal: 
customs duty of 20OM in the Federal Republic accompanied by a tariff quota of6 mil-
lion  metric  tons; different types of administrative  measure in  France,  Belgium  and 
the Netherlands. 
Petroleum products : 
inland consumption taxes varying widely from country to country: $ 2.20  in  France 
and$ 7.70 in the Federal Republic on heavy fuel oils; 
organisation  of the  market  with  publication  of pricescales  in  France, although the 
latter's effect is reduced by removal of  the prohibition on rebates; 
voluntary limitation of sales by oil companies in the Federal Republic, at the suggestion 
of the authorities. 
Community coal: 
financial  assistance  to  collieries  mainly  by  a  reduction of social  security  charges. 
All  these measures have  radically distorted the  relationship between the cost and 
price structures of the various forms of energy; Community coal is  sold below cost while 
petroleum products and imported coal are marketed at prices higher than cost. 
The consequences of these  measures can be  analysed from  two standpoints; first, 
their direct effectiveness and  secondly the additional cost so created for the Comrnunity. 
Barriers to coal imports have been largely effective. The$ 5 per ton duty imposed by 
Germany has so far proved prohibitive. In  1965, for example, imports amounted to only 
7,300,000 metric tons and did not exceed the tariff quota, allowing for military deliveries 
amounting to  1  ,500,000  metric tons.  Imports have also been held down or cut to a very 
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low level  by the regulations enforced in other countnes (1), with  11  million  metric tons 
(including 7 million of coking coal) for France and Benelux (5 and 6 million respectively)  .. 
Only Italian imports are rising and are now running at 10,500,000 metric tom which are 
needed to meet the growing demand from the iron and steel industry and to offset lower 
Community deliveries for which price alignment would be too costly. 
Restrictions on the import of coking coal have worked directly and exclusively to the~ 
advantage of Community coal but have raised the cost of supplies to the iron and steel 
industry. In the cas~ of steam coal, petroleum products have probably shared rhe benefits 
of  import quotas with Community coal. 
The policy of taxing oil fiJels,  adopted for different reasons by each country, has not 
appreciably slowed down the substitution of oil for coal. The consumption tax has been 
offset  by  higher coal  prices and  lower untaxed prices for liquid fuels (partie ularly light 
fuel oils over the last few years). 
The position  of the  oil  industry  has  been  affected  by changed market conditions 
reflecting the influence of institutional patterns on the intensity of competition. Cuts in 
costs at the  various stages  after production have  kept the fall  in  profit margins within 
reasonable  limits  for  the  major  integrated  companies  despite  lower  ex-refinery  nett 
backs (2). These margins still appear to be fairly satisfactory except on the mos't depressed 
markets but the same does not apply to all the small and medium-sized companies which 
generally have a lower ex-refinery nett back and frequently do not buy their crude at cost. 
With  the  exception of the few companies  which have  managed to acquire very cheap 
sources of crude (mainly in Libya), profit margins often seem too low to finance expansion 
and sometimes even to guarantee survival. 
Finally, distortions in taxation policy for the various petroleum products have in·· 
evitably given rise to difficulties. 
In Germany, for example, the lower rate of duty on light fuel  oils than on heavy 
types  has created so large a  demand for the former that substantial imports have been 
necessary to meet it. Conversely, the very high Italian duty on gas oil has so  fa1~ prevented 
its being used as fuel and has resulted in the accumulation of  surpluses. 
As external and internal protection have proved increasingly ineffectual, at least in 
the case of petroleum products, the authorities have substantially increased their  financial 
assistance to the coal  mining industry. 
By the terms of High Authority  Decision No. 3/65, taken in implementation of the 
Protocol of April  21,  1964,  financial  aid  given by Member States as compensation for 
"abnormally heavy" social  security charges arising from changes in the coli iery labour 
force  are  controlled at Community level.  This decision also sanctions the payment of 
subsidies for rationalising collieries and adjusting the rate at which they are closed down, 
taking due account of regional and social considerations. 
( 1)  Except during periods of temporary shortage, as in  1963. 
(2)  Ex-refinery nett back realisation is  calculated by using untaxed ex-refinery price and the share of the various products in refinery 
output  in  order to determine gross revenue per ton of crude after processing at the refinery.  Ex-refinery nett bicks which vary 
with country, region and quality of crude, as well as with the operating company, are analysed in the annex on oil supply conditions. 
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Information  from  Governments shows that in  1965  compensation for  "abnormally 
heavy" charges amounted to $4.20 per ton mixed in  the  Federal  Republic of Germany, 
$4.70 in France, $5.40 in Belgium and $0.85 in the Netherlands. 
Subsidies per ton mined ran at $0.40  in  the Federal Republic and, $0.80 in France 
and Belgium. 
Financial  assistance is  growing and spreading in the Community, while differences 
in the amount paid per ton in the various countries are narrowing. 
Two comments may help to point the significance of  these data: 
the figures  quoted relate to action taken under the terms of High  Authority Decision 
No.  3/65.  Other payments,  varying from  country to country, are  also  made;  they 
include financial assistance to some customers (to encourage the construction of ther-
mal  power stations and district heating plant) and certain Community coal hauliers, as 
well as payments to municipalities where miners live. 
it is  clear that a substantial fraction of the charges at present met by  the authorities 
are likely  to continue for some time l{/ter production is  stopped, because they relate 
to  past and not current production. Closures would merely prevent fresh  charges of 
this kind from being created by the engagement of new miners. Responsibility for past 
events will, of course, have to be accepted. 
TABLE6 
Trends in financial measures to assist the coalmining industry under the terms 
of  Decision No. 3/65 
Compensation for abnormally heavy social 
security charges 
Germany (Fed. Rep.) 
Belgium 
France 
Netherlands 
ubsidies  s 
G ermany (Fed. Rep.) 
Belgium 
France 
Netherlands 
(l)  Estimated. 
(2)  Converted to $at constant exchange rate:.. 
$1 =4DM 
508. Frs. 
4.937Fr. Frs. 
3.62florins 
$per ton mined (2) 
1960(1)  I 
1965 
1.9  4.2 
3.1  5.4 
1.0  4.7 
0.8 
0.2  0.4 
0.5  0.8 
0.1  0.8 
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This  increase  in  assistance  has  failed  to check  the deterioration of the:  collieries' 
financial  situation, but the position varies quite considerably from firm  to firm  not only 
because of differences in  winning conditions but also because losses on coalmining are 
offset  in  widely  varying  measure by  profits from the same firm's  other activities or by 
transfers from financially-linked companies. 
Lastly, in  1965,  as  in  1964,  the collieries'  cash  position  was  adversely  affected by 
storage charges, particularly in the Federal Republic. 
To sum up, the financial  difficulties of Community collieries are increasing despite 
protection, more Government assistance and opportunities for offsetting losses in certain 
cases. With output at its present level, there is no immediate prospect of any sub;tantial 
or lasting improvement. 
The final  point to consider, is the effect which energy policy measures over the last 
few  years have had on the rest of  the economy. One obvious consequence is higher energy 
prices for the consumer, who pays at least 4 dollars more per ton h.c.e. for his fuel at the 
point of production or import than he would if imported energy could be sold in unlimited 
quantity and without extra taxes. A less obvious, but more serious consequence is the cost 
which  the  community  has to  pay for channelling the factors  of production to activities 
(coalmining)  where,  because  of  unfavourable  geological  conditions,  their  economic 
utility is  markedly less than it would be in other sectors whose exports would cover the 
cost of additional energy imports. Coal could be imported at 12 dollars per ton h.c.e. and 
fuel oil could be obtained even more cheaply; in practice, tens of millions of tons of coal 
are mined at a cost of more than 19 dollars per ton on the basis of full costs and probably 
2 to 3 dollars I  ess on the basis of  partial costs (1 ). 
(
1
)  A partial-cost calculation is made only for pits scheduled for closure. In such cases partial costs include only current operating costs 
with preparatory work, equipment and maintenance cut to a minimum. 
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CONDITIONS FOR A BALANCED SITUATION IN  1970 
Trends from now until  1970 will  in  all  probability confirm those observed over the 
last few years, with the cost of imported energy remaining stable and that of Community 
coal continuing to rise. In spite of a fairly big increase in requirements, Community coal 
will  lose a substantial part of its market in the industrial and the domestic sector; at the 
same time, thermal power stations wili  only take more coal and thus partly offset the 
loss of other outlets, if sales to this  market are backed by special financial assistance. 
Section  1 
Overall economic context 
The survey carried out by the Working Group on Medium-term Economic Prospects, 
largely on the basis of studies made in member states, suggests that growth should continue 
over the period 1966  to 1970.  The rate of expansion is likely to be slower than between 
1950  and  1960  but similar to that of the last five  years. Little additional labour is  now 
available, but prospects for an increase in individual productivity were considered to be 
fairly good. 
Thus, Community G I P1)  is  expected to rise by an average of 4·3% per annum from 
1965  to 1970, with the rate slightly higher in Italy, France and the Netherlands and lower 
in the other countries. 
The Group's studies also show that this rate of growth will not be easy to achieve. It 
calls for vigorous investment and full employment of  the whole available active population, 
which means that it will  be difficult to keep the general price level approximately stable, 
as it must be if the balance of payments is to be in equilibrium. Measures to release man-
power and reduce production costs are therefore vital for expansion and the corresponding 
improvement of living standards. 
Section  2 
Probable demand for energy 
In the iron and steel industry, the sharp drop in unit coke consumption at blast fur-
naces is  likely  to slacken somewhat over the  next few  years, but even so blast-furnace 
input rates can be expected to fall  by a  further 15% or so, from 700 kg. in  1965  to about 
600  kg.  in  1970. The iron and steel industry will  continue to expand less rapidly than the 
economy as a whole; the General Objectives for Steel estimate that steel production may 
1)  Gross Internal Product. 
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rise from 85 million metric tons in 1965 to something like 9S million in 1970. The quantity 
of coke consumed by  the industry (including sintering) would  then remain around the 
present figure of 50 million metric tons. However, the construction of new plant to work 
rich  ores  near the coast will  mean  some transfer of the iron  and steel indu:itry at the 
expense of  centres near to the coalfields. 
TABLE 7 
Internal energy consumption and upper and lower limits for coal 
outlets in the Community 
('000,000 metric tons h.c.e.) 
Total_ene_rgY  Coal 
'000,000 m. tons  '000,000 m. tons  I 
%of  total 
h.c.e.  h.c.e.  disposals 
1965  I 
1970  1965  I 
1970  I 
1965  I 
1970 
I. Iron and steefl)  61  66  51  51  :22  26-22 
of  which coke·  (49)  (50) 
2. Other industries1)  115  144  25  15-22  11  7-9 
3. Transport1)  77  109  6.5  3  3  1 
4.  Household sector1)  139  165  50.5  35-45  22  18-19 
5. Power stations 
of  which hydro and nuclear  45  54  - - ·- -
conventional thermal  107  153  55  65,5-79  24  33-35 
6. Other producers and converters 
}  } 26-29  14  ofenergy1)  44  52  33  13-12 
7. Miscellaneous  8  4  2 
8. Total internal consumption  5%  743  225  195.5-229 
9.  Exports to third countries and 
bunkers  77  5.5  4  2  2 
10. Non-energy products and changes 
in stocks held by converters and final 
consumers  26  - -1 
II. Total disposals 
(Community and imported energy)  1699  1  1230  1199.5-2331  @  1~00 
1J Ellcluding electricity-see also notes to Table 2 in Chapter I. 
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Two points are to be noted concerning other industries: 
a  slower  increase  in  the  use  (~r .fitels;  the wave of technical  innovations introduced 
between 1950 and 1960 is now becoming spent. While industrial production is expected 
to rise by a little over 5% per annum, the corresponding increase in fuel requirements is 
put at about 4·5%. 
continued substitution between .fitels. Even when costs per thermal unit are the same, 
hydrocarbons have a  very marked advantage for certain users such as the  glass and 
pottery  industries,  which  stopped  using  coal  many years  ago, and  a  less, but real, CONDITIONS FOR A  BALANCED SITUATION IN 1970 
advantage for other purposes, such as  steam generation and  the  heating of cement 
ovens. With relative fuel  prices as they are, the present division does not produce a 
balanced situation.  Even if comparative prices remain  stable, the drop  in  industrial 
consumption of hard  coal and  coke  must therefore  be  expected to continue, from 
39  million  m.  tons h.c.e. in 1960, to 25  million in  1965 and something between 15  and 
22  million in  1970. The lower limit assumes a continuation of the trend observed over 
the past few years, while the upper limit would require a very marked slackening ofthe 
process of substitution, which would appear highly  unlikely if relative prices remain 
unchanged. 
On the basis of recent experience, the "Outlook's" estimate for the future require-
ments  of the  household sector has been raised.  As living standards rise, consumers are 
irlstaJling more space and water-heating plant with no sign of demand becoming saturated. 
This being so, requirements may increase by almost 20% from  1965 to 1970. Consumption 
of liquid and gaseous fuels  is  rising sharply but there was no absolute drop in solid fuel 
consumption until  1964.  On the other hand, the big decline recorded in  1965 suggests that 
convenience,  combined  with  lower prices,  will  be of increasing  importance  in  future, 
despite the fact that reluctance to convert plant is greatest in  the household sector. Sales 
of natural gas are  also  destined to increase substantially in this sector, but consumers' 
behaviour in five  years' time is difficult to forecast accurately. A range of 35 to 45 million 
m.  tons h.c.e. is therefore suggested for 1970 for coal and coke together, as against 51  mil-
lion at present, but the situation will  have to be closely followed. There seems little like-
lihood, however, that the trend will be materially affected by a movement ofrelative prices 
in favour of coal; a slight slowing down is the most that can be expected. 
Transport consumption will  continue to rise quickly, with almost exclusive concen-
tration on petroleum products. 
Electricity sonsumption will  increase rapidly, slightly more than doubling every ten 
years. Between 1965 and 1970, the main supply feature is the moderate rise in output from 
hydro power stations and those burning blast-furnace gas and brown coal; out of a total 
production increase of 180 TWh, these sources will  provide only 30 TWh. Allowing for 
higher nuclear production (20 to 25 TWh), coal, fuel oil  and gas will  thus have to supply 
a  further  125  TWh.  Keen  competition  between fuels  is  now  bound to develop in  this 
sector. The margin where fuels can be shifted will  be provided by the new power stations 
on the one hand and the alternative-fuel plant already in service on the other. 
Assuming  no  large-scale  conversion of existing plant,  investment projects suggest 
that coal  may  supply something between 66  and  79  million  m.  tons  h.c.e.  and fuel  oil 
between 56 and 43 million  m.  tons. The upper figure for coal disposals cannot be reached 
without further major support measures.  Furthermore, the existence and commissioning 
of alternative-fuel plant introduce a substantial margin of uncertainty into these estimates. 
Existing plant of this Kind,  burning coal and one other fuel, represent a production capac-
ity of about 10 TWh in  the Federal Republic,  10 TWh in  Belgium, 3 in  France and 5 in 
the Netherlands, with a total fuel consumption of 10 million m. tons h.c.e. Any large-scale 
conversion of these plants would affect the lower limit but it is  not easy to give a figure 
because many of the plants are not 100% interchangeable. 
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0\'erall.  internal  energy  consumption  should  rise  by 25%  while  coal consumption 
(Community and imported) could  be  anything up  to 30  million  n.  tons less than in  1965. 
These estimates for coal consumption are at present under consideration by several 
bodies  and  are therefore  liable  to  slight  modification.  The overall  adjustment is  more 
likely to be downwards, particularly from the upper limit we have quoted. 
Section  3 
Energy supply prospects 
The energy supply position in  1970 will  depend on decisions already taken or in hand, 
which  will  affect quantities, and on the trend of production cost elements, concerning 
which assumptions can be made. The adjustment of supply to demand is discussed in the 
paragraphs which follow. 
a)  Community coal 
Many decisions have  been announced during the last  few  months, concerning pro-
duction prospects for 1970. 
In France, the Government's Fifth Plan puts output at around 48-49 million metric 
tons, indicating that while this is a "firm" target "it may nevertheless have to be revised 
in the middle of  the period". 
In  Belgium,  the  Directoire  charbonnier  has  recommended  that  the  Government 
should cut production back to 15-16 mi1lion metric tons in  1970. 
The Netherlands Government has announced that output must be  expect<.~d to drop 
below  the  present figure  of  II  million  metric  tons, with a  reduction of about 30%  by 
1971-1972, according to the rate at which reconversion can proceed. 
By the terms of the German rationalisation law, undertakings were required to declare 
their closure plans by 31st October 1964  in  order to qualify for assistance. Allowing for 
announced closures and the counter-effect of using available capacity more fully at pits 
which are to remain open, companies' "anticipated" production can be put at 132 million 
m.  tons h.c.e.  More recently, however, much  lower tigures have been quoted, dropping 
to 115 million m. tons h.c.e. even before 1970. 
In  Italy,  production  may  reach  I  million  m.  tons  with  the  power station  built  in 
Sardinia in full operation. 
The  High  Authority  has  only  fragmentary  information  on  cost  trends,  but  some 
general  conclusions  are  possible.  There  is  still  ample  scope  for  improving yields,  but 
present mining  methods  will  have to  be  radically altered in  some cases. Over the next 
five  years,  the  increase seems unlikely to exceed 20%  (even this figure  will  be difficult 
to achieve  in  some coalfields).  Wages,  on  the other hand, are bound to rise at least as 
quickly as  national output per hour worked, at a rate of some 5% in  real  terms (i.e.  at 
constant general  price level); nominal wages may rise a little more quickly, as they have 
over the last few years. 
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Even assuming fuller use of capacities at pits which are to remain open, nominal costs 
are therefore likely to rise by at least 3% annually, to give a total increase of 15% between 
1965 and 1970, with variations from pit to pit. On the other hand, the calculation for mines 
due for closure should only take account of partial costs1) which are always lower than full 
costs, again with considerable variations from pit to pit. 
b)  Oil 
The growth  of production capacities  combined. with  the  size of reserves  suggests 
that world  supplies will  continue to be plentiful.  As hitherto, the Community will  have 
a very flexible supply pattern, based on substantial refinery capacity and an active exter-
nal trade. With this flexible arrangement, wide seasonal variations in demand can be cov-
ered. 
As regards  price trends, detailed analysis suggests that  FOB costs of crude are un-
likely to change; on the other hand, as newcomers consolidate and the fiscal advantages 
which  some  of them  are reported to enjoy, especially in  Libya,  are eliminated, prices 
should  show  a  slightly  firmer  tendency on the worst depressed  markets, and  margins 
should  improve.  Untaxed  prices  of heavy fuel  oil  at  coastal  refineries  may  therefore 
level off around $11·50 to 13·50 per metric ton ($8 to 9·50 per m.  ton h.c.e.). After a very 
steep drop in recent years, prices of medium distillates may remain fairly steady. 
With a capacity of some 400 millio·n metric tons, operated at much the same rate as 
in  1965 (about 85% of capacity at the end of the year) refinery output is estimated at 340 
million metric tons of  finished products~  frOlll which 3.5 million tons ofnon-energy products 
have  to be  deducted. The coastal refineries will  continue to be the most important and 
· may  export up to 35  million  metric tons, to which over 20  million have to be  added for 
bunkers, to give a total of almost 60 million metric tons. Against this, imports of finished 
products are likely  to remain substantial. In all, therefore, some 160 million metric tons, 
representing almost 375  million m.  tons h.c.e. should be available for the internal market 
(including refineries' own consumption). 
Regional imbalances. between supply and demand of refined. ·products, caused by the 
construction of inland  refineries over the  last few  years should be less marked.  In the 
immediate future,  no  new  inland refining areas are likely to be established and activity 
should be confined to extending those recently constructed. 
c)  Imported coal 
The cost of purchasing American coal should remain amlost steady until  1970, with 
possible  slight rises on  FOB prices offset by  increased use of large  vessels. The price 
should  be  around $13-13·50  for  coking  coals  and $11-11·50  for 7,500  kcal  steam  coal. 
d)  Other sources of  energy 
Production  of brown  coal  and  hydro- and  nuclear electricity will  be  limited,  with 
their total contribution rising from 74 million  m.  tons h.c.e. in  1965 to 88  million in  1970. 
t}  Partial costs are defined at the end of  Chapter I. 
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As already explained, this would mean a total of about 375 million m.  tons h.c.e. of 
oil reaching the market. Coal's remaining share would amount to 743-145-375 =  223 mil-
lion  metric  tons  h.c.e.1).  It will  be seen, therefore, that anticipated refinery capacities 
are consistent with coal disposals (imported and Community coal) nearer the upper limit 
of the range 200 to 233  million tons h.c.e.1). There is, however, a margin of uncertainty 
regarding imports of refined products, to the extent that these are not controlled. Finally, 
total coal disposals have to be shared between Community sources and imports. 
In the light of this  problem of quantities, it remains to consider what scope there is 
for action to create conditions which will  favour the marketing of a Community coal out-
put nearer the estimated upper limit for the various countries (something like  190 million 
tons or 185 million m. tons h.c.e.). 
This calls for a review by  sectors. 
As regards the iron m1d steel industry, where total outlets will not vary much, the ques-
tion  is whether the Governments will  maintain protection against American coal, with the 
consequent  cost  increase for an  industry already  known to be  in  difficulties on world 
markets, or whether they will favour a cut in prices of coke for the iron and steel industry; 
in the latter case, special aid will be needed to maintain Community coal disposals. 
.  Disposals to otlrer  ~·ndustrie.r will  be  low and a big drop in  relative  prices would be 
needed  to gain at most~  few million tons. 
Measures to limit imports of steam coal might perhaps check the drop in CommuJ1ity 
coal sales, but might at the same time assist fuel oil to some extent. 
The drop in  disposals to the  household sector, due partly to psychological factors, 
cannot be reversed and might at best be slowed
1 down by a change of a few dollars per 
m. ton h.c.e. in relative prices. 
Furthermore, some sales are decli,ning or will  de~line very quickly in  regions whose 
energy supply  pattern  i~ being changed completely. This applies, f()r example, to, parts 
of the .Nethedands, B,elg;ium,.Gern;lany and, North~rn france w~ich  will  b~ suppJied with 
natura! gas  forth~ first time: It is already the case. in Southern Germany where the con-
struction of  r~fi~eries  ha~,  be(!f1  followed  by  specta~ul,ar, pri.ce  red,ucti~ns, :which could 
cutdispos~ls from the R.ubrbyas much as fJft.een miiUonm  .. tons h,c.e. 
OveralL  changes  in· relative  prices· are unlikely to have any· appreciabJe  effect' ·on 
falling  sales  to other industries  and tile  houseHold  sector. ·The difference between the 
upper. and  lower limits· is: 'therefore, due much more to  uncertainty concerning the rate 
at which plant will be converted th'an'to any possibility ofintluehcing the market. 
The situation is  rather  rlift~rent in  the case ofthennal power  stati011.~:. where a limited 
number of large consumers have to be supplied. With the exception of pit power stations, 
they  only  burn coal  if the  price per calorie is  such that the cost  ofge~rating ele¢tricity, 
1)  Clearly, the figures  quoted apply only if the economic situation, water run-otT and weather conditions are all 
avemge.  In  boom  conditions,  accompanied  by  cold  weather and  low  run-off,  disposals  might  well  increase 
temporarily  by  several  million  metric tons; but no production programme can be  based on the hope of a  dry 
summer or a colo winter  ... 
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including capital  charges, is  no  higher than with other fuels.  They have a  wide choice 
because of the amount of new thermal plant to be commissioned in the years to come, the 
availability of plant burning more than one type of fuel  and the possibility of modifying 
plant to burn  a cheaper fuel.  In these circumstances, inertia can hardly be relied on to 
maintain coal sales, but conversely, any measure enabling producers to operate at the same 
cost with either coal or another fuel  will help to maintain or open outlets for Community 
coal. The margin for deliberate action in  this  sector is  therefore a little over 10  million 
m. tons h.c.e. 
The foregoing considerations suggest that measures to aid Community coal sales over 
the next few years should differ appreciably from present policies.  Because outlets vary, 
assistance has so far taken the form of financial aid, more or less geared to output, com-
bined with taxes to raise the retail price of competing fuels to the consumer. As disposals 
are likely in  future to be concentrated on the iron and steel industry and thermal power 
stations,  which  offer  the  sole  hope of increased  sales,  it  might  be  possible to  reduce 
taxes  and customs  barriers on competing types of energy,  while deliberate  I}'  assisting 
disposals of Community coal to coke ovens and power stations; specific measures of this 
kind  would be  particularly effective in  helping coal sales and would reduce the cost of 
energy to all users. These suggestions should be read in conjunction with the '"Outlook", 
since they stress the importance of enabling the consumer to share the benefits of low 
energy prices  and  at  the  same  time  clearly  specifiy  the type of assistance needed by 
Community  coal  to  ensure  reliable  supplies  and  a  regular pattern of production and 
employment at the collieries. 
Section 5 
Problems of the oil industry 
As  already  noted, with  the  possibility of a  firmer price trend on the most depres-
sed markets, the margins earned by  the big integrated companies should be adequate to 
finance the industry's expansion and maintain the effort to diversify exploration. On the 
other hand, the position of some Community companies may raise a number of problems. 
With  wide  variations from  company  to company and  country to country, these firms 
cannot make such big economies of scale and often have higher crude costs, either because 
their fields  are less  advantageous1)  or because they buy from other producers. Finally, 
they are often handicapped by the institutions and taxation systems with which :they have 
to deal.  In particular, the fiscal  systems of the Anglo-Saxon countries reduce the effect 
of an increase  in  taxes in  the producing countries but Community companies generally 
have no such advantages. 
The growth of the Community's  oil  industry, stemming grom oil's rising  share  in 
energy supplies, would be fostered by the promotion of economies of scale, high capacity-
utilisation  rates  and  encouragement  to  exploration  in  the  Community  and elsewhere. 
1)  Except those with access to the Libyan oilfields. 
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Section  6 
Community energy balance-sheet 
An energy balance-sheet for the Community in  1970 can now be sketched (Table 8): 
the lower limit for Community coal represents·estimated potential disposals if present 
aid policies are continued; 
the upper limit represents potential disposals if inertia is strong among industrial and 
domestic users and Governments step up their aid, particularly for sales to the iron and 
steel industry and thermal power stations. 
The present figure for imported coal has not been raised much except in  the case of 
Italy; it  would,  however,  have to be increased substantially if restrictions on the entry 
of American coal were lowered with no change in the current tax on fuel oil. 
The limits for oil follow from those for coal. 
Breakdown of the coverage of Community internal requirements shows that the share 
going to imported  energy  should increase from  46% in  1965 to 51% if Community coal 
disposals amount to almost 200 million m.  tons h.c.e. and 55%  with disposals of 170 mil-
lion. 
This calculation narrows the range quoted in the "Outlook" (Table 58) and increases 
oil's share in the coverage of requirements. The rise of some 60  million m. tons h.c.e. for 
oil is the result of  three corrections: 
- higher estimate for total energy requiremmts and attribution of the difference to hydro-
carbons; 
adoption of the lower figure given in the .. Outlook" for imported coal, because of the 
protective measures in force; 
the much narrower range for estimated sales of Community coal. 
TABLE 8 
Coverage of  the Community's internal energy requirements in 1965 and 1970 
'000,000 metric tons h.c.e. 
Community origin  Net  imports1)  Total 
1945  I 
1970  1965  I 
1970  1965  I  1970  I 
Hard coal  201(2)  168-198  23  32-35  224  200-233 
Brown coal  32  36  2  2  34  38 
Oil  25  28  245  37~337  270  398-365 
Natural gas  22  47  (0.5)  6  23  53 
Hydro  and  geothermal  power  40  41  3  2  43  43 
Nuclear energy  2  11  - - 2  11 
Total  322  1331-3611  274  1412-3821  596  I 
743 
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(as% of  tot  a/ requirements) 
Hard coal  34  23-24  4  4-5  38  27-32 
Brown coal  5  5  0.5  6  5 
Oil  4  4  41  50-45  45  54-49 
Natural gas  4  6  1  4  7 
Hydro and geothermal 
power  7  6  0.5  7  6 
Nuclear energy  1  1 
Total  54  45--49  46  55-51  100  100 
1)  Less exports: for coal 6 in 1965, 4 in 1970. See table 7. 
2)  Tonnages put to stock must be taken into account to calculate production. 
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ASPECTS OF A BALANCED SITUATION AROUND  1980 
The Community and world economic background to any long-term view of energy 
problems  contains  many  elements  of uncertainty,  but there is  reason to suppose that 
growth will  continue to be fairly rapid and estimates of energy demand are based on this 
assumption. 
Production potential resulting from decisions already taken or virtually certain to be 
so will  supply only a fraction of these requirements. Ways and means of covering future 
demand must therefore be considered. Even with rapidly-increasing production of natural 
gas and nuclear energy in the Community, substantial imports will still be needed, so that 
the supply position can only be considered properly in a world context. 
Section  1 
Future energy requirements 
A  .:.....  Community energy requirements 
Forecasts  of economic growth  beyond  1970  have  so far been isolated and rather 
incomplete, and have not given such a full  and reasoned assessment as for the next five 
years. There are, however, several grounds for believing that output per man wiJJ  go on 
rising fairly quickly: 
research  activities  will  continue  to  expand and  realisation of the  need  to  remove 
obstacles to progress should  help to expedite the introduction of new processes and 
the ex  pension of new types of product; 
even  with  exi~ting techniques  there is  scope for  a  substantial  increas~ in  average 
productivity. Productivity and efficiency still vary widely both between branches and 
between firms in the same branch. Consequently, in certain countries at least, quite a 
large  part of the active population can still  be transferred from  low-productivity to 
high-productivity jobs; it  may  also be hoped that less  efficient firms  in  a particular 
branch will tend to align themselves on the most efficient; 
lastly, the removal of obstacles to the movement of goods, capital and workers in the 
Common Market and the progressive application of common policies should lead to 
more efficient use of the factors of production and should gradually help us  to catch 
up on the United States, where average output per man is almost twice as high as in the 
Community. 
Allowing for these  points and the fact that the economically active population will 
rise very little in  Germany and by 0·5 to 1% per annum in the other countries, it has been 
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assumed that over the decade 1970 - 1980 the annual increase in Community gross inter-
nal product will  be much the same as between now and 1970.  Industrial production should 
continue to  rise  much more  rapidly,  particularly in  the least industrialised countries of 
the Community. 
a)  By  1970, the Community iron and steel industry will still be a long way from absor-
bing the full  reduction in  blast-furnace fuel  rates (particularly for coke) made possible by 
lighter burdens resulting from the use of rich ores, preparation of the burden, 1:he  use of 
large plant, the injection of solid, liquid or gaseous fuels instead of coke and higher blast 
speeds and temperatures. As plant must be modernised if the Community iron and steel 
industry is to continue competing with the newcomers to world markets, these technical 
improvements are likely  to be widely adopted. The expected outcome is a drop of 25  to 
30% on the blast furnace fuel  rate of730 kg. coke equivalent attained in 1965; the propor-
tions  of coke and other fuels  will  obviously depend on their prices and will  d1.ffer  from 
region to region; at Community level a figure of about 480 to 500 kg. of coke can be fore-
cast as compared with 700 kg. in 1965. 
Iron and -steel--production will  rise but almost certainly less than between 1950 and 
--- 1960. 
If  these assumptions are correct, total coke consumption (including tonnages used for 
sintering and other purposes) should remain substantially unchanged. 
b)  Studies of likely  technical  developments in industries which use large quantities 
of energy have shown that the period 1950- 1960 was rather exceptional. In the space of a 
few years, many technical improvements, including some dating back a number of years, 
were introduced, with a resultant sharp drop in unit consumption over the ten-year period 
followed  by  a slower decline.  Prospects for  the future appear much less promising. The 
possibility of a further wave of technical advances in energy consumption over the next 
10  or  15  years cannot of course  be  excluded; but,  in  the light  of fresh data, it  seemed 
reasonable to raise the forecasts for 1970 and beyond and to assume that unit fuel consump-
tion would fall  only moderately between 1965 and 1980 (about 1·5% per annum as against 
3  ·1% recorded from 1950 to 1960 for all industries other than iron and steel). 
Assuming an  annual  increase of slightly over 5%  in  industrial production, the fuel 
consumption of industries other than iron and steel should therefore rise by 4% per annum, 
to about 205  million m.  tons h.c.e. by 1980.  Unless there is a dramatic change in relative 
prices, the drop in coal consumption already discussed will continue, so that around 1980 
solid  fuels  may be  covering only  a  small  fraction  of requirements; on the other hand, 
with  the  quantities  mentioned  as  likely  to  be  available,  natural gas  may be  :mpplying 
30%or more. 
c)  Forecasting  is  most  difficult  for  the  household  sector.  Fuel  consumption  per 
capita (760 kg.  in the Community in 1965) is still farless than in the United States (1,870 kg. 
in  1963).  However, the  increase  has  not slowed down over the  last few  years, which 
suggests  that the "Outlook" was a little premature in forecasting gradual saturation. The 
figure has therefore been increased to 220 million m. tons h.c.e. in 1980. 
The breakdown between fuels  will  depend not only on comparative prices but also 
on  the  weight  which  consumers  attach  to  convenience.  As  living  standards rise  this 
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factor will gain in importance; it would therefore seem reasonable to assume a steep drop 
in  solid  fuel  consumption accompanied by a  sharp increase for gas, which  may  cover 
almost 40% of requirements. 
d)  As more and more vehicles come on to the road, demand for motor spirit should 
continue to  rise  rapidly, and may more than double to reach  165  million m.  tons h.c.e. 
by 1980. 
e)  With the expectation of swift technical progress in  industry and increasing sales 
of domestic appliances, demand for electricity may well increase almost as quickly as over 
the  last fifteen  years.  More specifically, other industries' requirements should be multi-
plied by 2·8 in  15 years while domestic demand will rise fourfold to give an overall increase 
of 290%,  raising gross total consumption from 416 TWh in  1965  to over 1,200  by  1980. 
Expansion on this scale will, however, only be achieved if the relative drop in electricity 
prices as compared with the general" price level can be maintained. 
Another point of interest is that households' share in,electricity consumption should 
advance from  26%  in  1965 to 35% in  1980, with appreciable effects on the breakdown of 
earnings between high and low voltage sales and a bigger proportion of investments for 
the distribution side of the electricity sector. 
f) The productive efficiency of thermal power stations burning fossil  fuels  may be 
expected to improve still further but possibilities in this direction are decreasing. Average 
consumption per gross kWh should thus drop from 2,820 kcal in  1960 to 2,530 in  1965 and 
2,235 in 1980. 
g)  The Community's overall energy requirements  are expected to  almost double in 
fifteen  years (+ 90%)  from 596  million m.  tons  h.c.e. in  1965  to around  1,130  million in 
1980.  The average annual increase of 4·4%  is  thus  very  slightly  higher than the figure 
TABLE 9 
Community internal energy consumption by sectors 1965-1980 
'000,000 m. tons h. c. e.  %of  total  I  Average 
-----:----------:----- annual 
1965  1980  1965  1980  increase 
1.  Iron and steel1)  61  74  10  7  1.3% 
of which coke  (49)  (51)  (8)  (5) 
2.  Other industries1)  115  205  19  18  3.9% 
3.  Transport1)  77  164  13  15  5.2% 
4.  Household sector1)  139  220  24  19  3.1% 
5.  Power stations  152  386  25  34  6.4% 
6. Other energy producers and 
converters1)  44  }  81  8  }  7  3.0% 
7.  Miscellaneous1)  8  1 
8. Total internal consumption  596  1.130  100  100  4.4% 
1)  Excluding electricity. See also notes to Table 2 in Chapter I. 
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suggested in the "Outlook" for the period 1960- 1975. As indicated in the same document, 
the requirements of transport (15%)  and power stations (34%) will  account for virtually 
half the Community's energy consumption. The rapid growth of requirements assumed in 
this report is in fact due to the steep increase in demand from these two sectors.1) 
B  - World enerRY requirements 
The Community's energy problems in 1980 can only be analysed in a world context 
because hydrocarbons will  inevitably have to  be  imported to cover most of its require-
ments. 
The trend of world demand has therefore deliberately been estimated on the assump-
tion of  rapid world economic expansion, with a steep rise in energy requirements (Table 1  0). 
In 1960, Community demand accounted for about 10% of world energy requ[rements 
amounting to 4,400  million m.  tons h.c.e. The industrialised countries of the free  world 
(Western  Europe,  North America and Japan) absorbed 2,500  million  or almost 60% of 
all world energy. The developing countries took only about 10%. 
With  economic expansion in  the free world running at 4 to 5%  per annum, energy 
requirements should rise by  about 4·5% annually,  to  reach 7,000 million m.  tons h.c.e. 
by 1980, including 5,600 million in the highly-developed areas. 
The forecast is  least reliable for the developing countries. With the suggested figure, 
consumption per head would  still  be  very low in  1980  but there would be a fairly rapid 
increase over the  next fifteen  years (6%  per annum).  A  vigorous upsurge of e•:onomic 
activitiy in  the least advanced countries-of which there is unfortunately no sign at pre-
sent-might produce a bigger demand; for payments reasons, however, these requirements 
could probably only be  covered if national production were high; the figures  now pro-
posed are therefore consistent with the production data given later in Table 16. 
Although  information for the  Communist countries is  very incomplete, demand is 
likely to go on increasing more rapidly than in the free world, as in recent years. 
On the  basis  of these  assumptions,  world  requirements should increase by about 
4·7% annually as against 5·1% from 1953 to 1963, thus reaching 6,800 million m. tons h.c.e. 
in 1970 and 10,900 million in 1980. 
These estimates largely confirm the figures  produced by the Energy Committee of 
O.E.C.D., but indicate a smaller rise in Japan. 
Despite increased demand from the developing countries and the Communi:;t states, 
the  industrialised  countries  of the free  world  will  still  account for over 50%  of world 
consumption in 1980, with 10% going to the Community and almost 30% to North America. 
1)  Glohal  extrapolations  linking  economic  expansion  and  energy consumption tend  to  give  lower ligures  (cf. 
Annex 1). 
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TABLE 10 
Total energy requirements: 1960-1970-1980 
('000,000 m. tons h.c.e.) 
Apparent internal  Rate of increase 
Total energy requirements! 
%oftotal  (internal consumption 
consumption  (% per annum)  and bunkers)  requirements 
1960  11970  11980  1953-11960--
1963  1980  1960  11970  11980  1960  1  1980 
I. Western Europe 
of  which Commu- 810  1,245  1,835  +  4.2  +  4.2  845  1,300  1,920  19  18 
nitv 
430  715  1.100  +  5.5  +  4.8  445  745  1,150  10  10 
2. North America 
of  which United  1,555  2,240  3,130  +  3.0  +  3.6  1,580  2,270  3,170  36  29 
States  1,455  2,075  2,870  +  2.8  +  3.5  1,475  2,100  2,900·  34  27 
3. Japan  110  250  500  +8.6  +  7.8  115  275  540  3  5 
4. Total (1+2+3)  2,475  13.735 I  s,4651 +  3.71 +  4.o 12,540  131845 I  5,630 I 58  I  52 
5.  Latin America  140  270  520  +7.7 +  6.8  155  295  555  4  5 
6. Africa  70  100  165  +4.6  +  4.4  75  110  180  2  2 
7. Middle East  30  65  130  +9.5  +  7.6  50  95  190  1  2 
8. South and South-
East Asia  110  200  360  +  7.9  +  6.1  115  210  380  3  3 
9. Oceania  '  45  75  120  +4.1:  +  5.1  50  80  130  1  1 
10. Total developing 
3951  1,2951 + 6.9 j  + 6.11  4451  790  11.4351  I  regions (5-9)  710  11  13 
11. Total free world  2,870  14,44516.760 1  + 4.01 + 4.412.98514.63517.0651  I 
(4-9)  69  65 
12. Communist coun-
1,365  t 2,175,3,8351 +  8.3, +  5.31.1,365,2.175. ,3,8351  31  I 
35  tries of  which 
Soviet Union  605  1.100  1.790  +  5.6  +5.6  605  1,100  1.790  14  16 
13. Whole w9rld  4,235,6,620 !to,s9sl + 5.1, +  4.7,4,350 16,810  110,900 !too  I 
100 
Source:  UN, World Energy Supplies except for the Community (High Authority statistics). The statistics for hydro power ha've been 
adapted to UN formulas, with the result that the Community figures differ slightly from those in other tables. 
Section  2 
a)  Natural gas 
Community production 
Even on a cautious estimate, natural gas will be making a big contribution to Commu-
nity energy supplies by 1980. 
Proved and probable reserves at present exceed 2 billion cubic metres,1)  of which 
1.8  billion  have  recently  been discovered  in  the  Northern Netherlands and Germany; 
geological  conditions  are so  good  in  these areas  that, on the basis of what is  already 
known, the experts can count on on-shore reserves of at least 2112  billion cubic metres 
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in  1980.  With  favourable  reports  from  the North Sea and further probable sources in 
France and  Italy, the Community's  natural gas reserves should reach at least  3 billion 
cubic  metres  in  1980.  Assuming that the fields  in  the  north of the Community will  be 
worked for 25  to 30  years and the other fields  more quickly, Community output can be 
put at 110,000 million to 130,000 million cubic metres. 
A further  10,000 million to 15,000  million cubic metres (with a net calorific: value of 
8,200  kcal/Jl'i3)  are likely to be  imported from  North Africa. This is a modest estimate 
in relation to the reserves available in that part of the world (over 2 billion cubic metres); 
it is based on the higher cost of transport by tanker and the problems involved in building 
pipe-lines to Europe. 
In all, therefore, the Community should have 120,000 million to 140,000 million m3 , or 
130 to 160 million m. tons h.c.e. by 1980. 
b) Oil 
Discoveries within the Community have so far been relatively small, with proved re-
serves of slightly more than 300 million tons and a  1965 output of about 16 million tons, 
representing 75% of total West European production. Although several deposits are worth 
working  because of their size and location, present geological knowledge does not sug-
gest any  major  increase in  reserves.  The exploration of certain off-shore  art~as might 
produce discoveries of greater value, but there is no means of knowing in advance whether 
they will find  oil associated as usual with natural gas or natural gas alone, becan:;;e depos-
its differ according to their source and the way  in which the original organic matter has 
been transformed. 
Within the  range  of 35  million  to 50  million tons suggested for Western Europe in 
1980,  Community oil  production is  forecast at between 25  million and 40 million tons of 
crude (approximately 30 to 50 million m. tons h.c.e.). 
I 
c) Nuclear energy 
Prospects for increased use of nuclear energy in  the Community are  discussed  in 
detail in documents recently issued by the Euratom Commission. 
The .. First Indicative  Programme  for  the  European Atomic  Energy Community" 
suggests installed nuclear capacity of at least 40,000  MWe as the target for 1980. This 
minimum figure was regarded as extremely cautious by the various authorities concerned 
when they met at Venice and Stresa in  April and May 1965,  and this  view was more 
generally  confirmed  when  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  gave  its  opinion  on 
February 24, 1966. 
Meanwhile, programmes  and  intentions announced by most member Governments 
indicate a capacity of almost 60,000 MWe for the Community as a whole in 1980. 
Annual  production  of nuclear  electricity  should  be  between 280,000  million  kWh 
and about 400,000  million  kWh, according to whether installed capacity is  40,000  MWe 
or almost 60,000 MWe. 
These forecasts are based on the immediate ability of nuclear energy to compete with 
electricity generated at large thermal power stations used to cover the base load. 
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According  to  the  previous  version  of the  "Outlook", nuclear power stations with 
tested  reactors  which  can be  put into service around  1970  should be  able to compete 
with  conventional  power stations  burning fossil  fuel  costing  10  to 12  units of account 
per ton h.c.e. delivered to the power station. It will be recalled that the margin between 
these two figures was due to differences in interest rates from country to country (approx-
imately 8,  10  and  13%)  and in  the annual plant utilisation periods used for purposes of 
calculation (6,000 and 7,000 hours). 
Recent trends, confirmed by  construction tenders in  both the Community and the 
United States, suggest that these figures  should be revised and that, at the high annual 
loads which may  be  expected1)  from  1970 onwards, the threshold of competition will lie 
somewhere between 8 and 9 units of account and will  certainly continue to fall  beyond 
that date. 
The so-called "advanced converter" reactors now in course of development will use 
a  bigger  proportion  of the uranium's or thorium's  fissile  energy.  The  most promising 
models  are the heavy-water and gas-graphite reactors. Cautious estimates indicate that 
the cost advantage of power stations equipped with this type of reactor over stations bur-
ning  fossil  fuels  will  be  greater than that of stations with industrially-proved reactors. 
Finally, major efforts are being concentrated on research and development work on 
fast-neutron breeder reactors in the Community, the United States, the United Kingdom 
and the Soviet Union. When ready they can be  expect~ to make a vital contribution to 
solving the problem of fossil-fuel supplies; they will also be an excellent proposition from 
the economic standpoint.  It is  still  too early to suggest with  any certainty when these 
reactors will be ready for industrial production but the time now appears to be nearer than 
could be expected a few years ago, when it was put at 1980 to 1985. 
On the  subject of nuclear fuel  supplies,  Euratom has estimated the Community's 
uranium requirements on the basis of production running at 28 TWh in  1970, 280 in  1980 
and  2,400  ill  the  year 2,000.  Two of the development  models considered  merit special 
attention: model  I uses only proved reactors over the whole period while model IV uses 
advanced converters for the transition from proved reactors to fast breeders which should 
come into service in  1980 and should account for over half total capacity by the end of 
the century. The Community's uranium requirements would then be as follows, expressed 
in thousands of  metric tons of  natural uranium metal: 
Period 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1979 
1989 
1999 
Total 
I 
64 
176 
412 
652 
Model 
IV 
54 
122 
156 
332 
1)  The planned output of 280 TWh in  1980 represents about 25% of total electricity production. This percentage 
should be set against the proportion of total annual consumption covered by the 7,000-hour load, which member 
countries' individual curves for 1964 put at about half the total. Failing any far-reaching changes in the pattern 
of electricity consumption, particularly as regards the relative importance of heavy consuming industries, expe-
rience over the past fifteen years gives no reason to think that the sahpe of the above curves will change signif-
icantly. It may be assumed, therefore, that in  1980 nuclear electricity will  be generated by power stations run-
ning for 7,000 hours a year. 
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Reserves workable at a  price not exceeding that normally used for estimating costs 
per kWh i.e. $8 to 10 per lb.  UaOs  were estimated as follows on 1st January  196~l in thou-
sands of metric tons of  uranium metal. 
Proved reserves 
Announced potential 
additional reserves 
United States  122  200 
Canada  160  180 
South Africa  112 
Community  31  24 
Other countries  55  12 
Whole of  free world  480  416 
Allowing for the fact that world requirements may be four or five times greater than 
the Community's, it will be  se~n that known reserves will be exhausted by about 1985 
and, announced rotential reserves by the. end of the centJ.lfy. However, potential reserves 
workable at a  price between $10  and $20 per lb.  UaOs are much bigger than the quanti-
ties workable at less  th~m '$to. 'In Europe, for e'xample, ores workable in this price range 
are known·to include the Swedish shales containing some 700,000 metric tons of uranium. 
Other points to be bo.rne in mind include : 
because of tfte present uranium price of about·  $4 to $5  per lb.:  exploration has almost 
been brought to a halt:  · ' 
in order to cover uranium requirements whic~ are bound to increase  r~pidly, prospect-
ing  should be  resumed immediately; this  will  certainly bring .to  light  substantial re-
serves workable at  prices similai to the quoted fig~res of $8  to  10  per lb.  of UaO!; 
•  '  '  ;  ,,  '  •  J 
the pric.e of uranium has relatively liHie influence on costs per kWh;· whether enriched 
or not, natural uranium.accounts for less than 10% of the cost per kWh generated ·at 
proved nuclear power stations. Thus, dearer sources of supply can be used without 
appreciably reducing the competitive advantage of nuclear·  power stations, 
Lastly, nuclear energy canl)e regarded as a Community sourcefrom the standpoint 
of security of supplies. despite the fact that most ofthe uranium will  be  imported. The 
nuclear fuel  required to produce a given amount of electricity already costs four to five 
times less than fossil fuel, and this advantage will become greater as techniques improve. 
Moreover, uranium does not come from the same countries as the fossil fuel, oil, which the 
Community imports in  the greatest quantity. Again, uranium is easy and cheap to store. 
Quite apart from  the fact  that reactors  can work independently 'from fresh  supplies, it 
would cost far tess to set up reserves for nuclear power stations than to provide equiva-
lent reserves for conventional thermal power stations. 
d) Community coal 
There is still considerable scope for improving yields from pits already in use, but this 
will  involve .radical changes in  the mining methods used at present. Concentration will 
be the main aim and will  in many cases only be effective if steps are taken to combine two 
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This table calls for the following comments: 
the figures for brown coal and hydro power are fairly certain; 
the figures  for natural gas represent a  somewhat cautious estimate:. the fairly narrow 
range allows for the possibility of offshore discoveries; 
the figure for nuclear energy is derived from estimates made by the Euratom Commis-
sion  itself;  its achievement depends on the adoption and firm  implementation of the 
policy outlined by the Commission; 
the very wide range quoted for Community coal production is merely intended to show 
how dependence on imports is  affected by coal production; if output drops to 100 mil-
lion  metric  tons,  which  would  still  exceed the strictly competitive nucleus for  1980, 
dependence on outside sources, expressed as the proportion of imports in  total con-
sumption, exceeds 60%. To keep dependence below 50%, either the figures for other 
types of energy  would  have  to  be raised  or Community coal output would have to 
remain around the figure of 185  million  m.  tons h.c.e. set as the target for 19i'O  by the 
High Authority. This would be extremely costly. 
In any event. large tonnages will have to be imported. which means that clos(~ consid-
eration will have to be given to world energy supply conditions around 1980. 
Section  3 
External supplies 
The Community's ability to import energy can only be assessed after tirst cor:sidering 
the general coverage of world energy requirements in  fifteen years' time.  We shall there-
fore briefly discuss the world energy balance-sheet around 1980 before examining first the 
physical and economic conditions of oil  and American coal production and secc ndly the 
factors governing trends in world energy prices. 
A  - World energy balance-sheet 
Tables  12  A  to D  which appear later are not claimed to he forecasts, but  r~~present 
possible  alternatives showing the  main  features  and  principal  magnitudes of the  world 
balance-sheet. 
A  single set of figures has been used for requirements; they have already been given 
and are based on the assumption that the world economy will expand fairly quickly. For 
production,  however,  we  must  consider  several  variants  corresponding  to  different 
concepts of energy policy in  the United States and  Europe; the  main differences relate 
to oil production in  the United States, energy production in Europe, the amount of Ameri-
can coal required and oil production in Africa. 
a)  North Amcric(/n oil Sllf'plies 
At the moment, imports of oil to the United States are of course  ~,everely r<~stricted 
hy quota, as the Americans try to supply almost all  their energy from domestic sources. 
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Current  policy  aims  at  covering  the  growth  of requirements  hy  discovering fresh 
reserves  on  a  sufficient  scale  to  maintain  a  constant  ratio  between  proved  reservfs 
(genuine strategic reserves) and production. On this  basis, imports may increase abso-
lutely but not relatively.  Exploration costs are tending to rise in  the United States and, 
failing  any  m~~jor change in  American oil  legislation. will  continue to do so as increasing 
American demand calls for bigger and bigger annual discoveries. 
for example. if the United States wish to raise annual output from 436 to 660 million 
tons and still  have a  reserves/production ratio of 12  in  1980.  they  will  have to discover 
I 1.700  million tons of recoverahle reserves from  1965  to  1980,  as compared  with actual 
discoveries amounting to 6.800 million tons between 1950 and 1965. 
A cost ceiling is  however imposed by the cost of extracting oil from bituminous sands 
and shales, which appears to be about $3  to 5 above that of producing oil  at the moment 
but is  likely to drop substantially over a period. 
Exploration  may  also  be  supplemented  hy  work  in  Canada, whose oil  economy is 
linked with that of the United States. 
The amount of exploration required to fulfil  American policy is  nevertheless likely 
to create major problems and the possibility of a change in policy to allow larger imports 
cannot be ruled out. 
Two alternatives were therefore constdered.  First, it  was assumed that the  United 
States and Canada would increase their national production regardless of higher costs 
and would import mainly from the Western hemisphere. The second hypothesis was that 
North American production would rise more slowly, in  which case production in  South 
America, and more particularly Venezuela, would increase and some oil would be impor-
ted from the Eastern hemisphere. 
The margin  between the two alternatives was put at  100  million tons of oil  for the 
United States and 50 million for Canada. There seemed no reason to take a higher figure, 
because of the United States' strategic interest in  maintaining large internal supplies and 
their ability to carry higher costs with over 60% of all  oil  products consumed in  the form 
of motor fuels, The lower production figure is  based substantially on the quantity required 
for automotive purposes. 
b) Indigenous production in  Western Europe 
The upper and lower energy alternatives for Westem Europe are largely a reflection 
of different production forecasts for coal (maximum 410 million m.  tons of brown coal). 
For nuclear energy the assumptions include the margin given in Table II  for the Commu-
nity  and  national  or OEC D  forecasts  for other countries.  Finally, for  natural  gas  the 
margin of 50  million  m.  tons  h.c.e.  (including 30 million in  the Community) is  intended 
purely as a  guide and  is  largely due  to  uncertainty concerning the  results of off-shore 
ex  p !oration. 
c)  Irnports q{American coal 
The third alternative is  concerned with  whether Western Europe and Japan import 
larger or smaller quantities of American coal. 
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Taking low exports, it was assumed that sales of American coal to Europe would rise 
only  slightly,  with  a  bigger increase  in  disposals  to Japan and  Latin  America.  On this 
basis, net exports from North America are put at 65 million m. tons h.c.e. 
Taking high  exports,  it  was  assumed that American coal would cover one third of 
Western Europe's requirements of coking coal  (35  million m.  tons) and 201){  of require-
ments for power stations (80  million m. tons). With increased disposals to Japan also the 
total  reaches  175  million  m.  tons1), which is  well  below the availabilities of 300 million 
m. tons h.c.e. estimated by the OECD. 
d) Oil production in Africa 
This will depend to a large extent on the <!mount of exploration undertaken in Africa 
by the  industrialised countries.  The high  estimate for production is  based on the effort 
to diversify these countries' sources of supply. 
If all  these  hypotheses  were  taken  in  pairs,  too many  variants would  have to be 
considered. Two of special interest have therefore been selected. 
The first variant (alternative I) assumes high production in the industrialised countries, 
substantial diversification in  sources of crude oil  and high  imports of American coal  to 
Europe and Japan. 
On this assumption, however, heavy exports of American coal would replace some 
domestic  coal  production  in  Europe  and  Japan.  A  downward  correction  is  rherefore 
necessary. 
The second variant (alternative 2)  combines low production in  North Am1:rica  and 
Europe with low imports of American coal. This mearts that industrialised regions would 
import large quantities of hydrocarbons, particularly from the Middle East. 
Lastly, for both variants, we assumed the Communist countries to be self-:mfticient 
and allowed for no  exports to the Western countries. We did  so because of uncertainty 
concerning the  extent  of future  trade  with  the  Eastern countries and even whether it 
would show a surplus of  imports or exports. 
Alternatives 1  and 2 can now be summarised as follows: 
First alternative 
1. General policy concept 
Policy of security at high-cost for the 
industrialised  regions,  based  on 
internal  production  and  diversifi-
cation of oil imports. 
Second alternative 
1.  General policy concept 
Heavy imports of oil from the Middle 
East, where exploration is  cheaper, 
but security problems are more diffi-
cult. 
1)  As coal is  exported from the United States to Canada the figures for the former are: lower alternativE: 85; higher 
alternative: 195. 
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First alternative 
2.  Mainfeatures 
a)  high  oil  production  in  North 
America. 
b)  high  American  coal  exports. 
c)  high  internal  production  in 
Europe. 
d)  less  adjustment  (60  million  m. 
tons  h.c.e.)  affecting  either  b) 
or c). 
e)  high  hydrocarbon  production 
in  Africa. 
f)  Communist  world  self-sufficient. 
Second alternative 
2.  Mainfeatures 
a)  low  oil  production  m  North 
America. 
b)  low  American  coal  exports. 
c)  low  internal  production  in 
Europe. 
d)  low  hydrocarbon  production  m 
Africa. 
e)  Communist  world  self-sufficient. 
These alternatives are only  two examples.  In both cases the margin between esti-
mates is the combined result of: 
I)  uncert{linty concernint.: technical and economic conditions on the world energy market 
in  fifteen  years' time.  Oil exploration problems are typical  sources of uncertainty in 
this respect; 
2)  the direction that GoFernment policy may take in third countries, for example as regards 
opening the American oil market; 
3)  the direction of Community economic policy, for example as regards coal or nuclear 
energy. 
All  these factors are  unlikely to act simultaneously at maximum force in  the same 
direction.  In our estimated figures, therefore, the margin between the two alternatives is 
not carried to its theoretical limit. 
As they stand, these balance sheets indicate a few basic energy trends over the years 
to come: 
a shortllge of  energy in  the industrialised countries, particularly Western Europe and 
Japan. The deficit will be at least,  I ,000 million m. tons h.c.e.  in  the former and 450 
million in the latter bv 1980. 
imports of Middle  East crude oil in  either case. Under the first alternative only 1,300 
million  m.  tons  h.c.e.  ( 1,000  million  tons of crude oil)  would  be  needed  as  against 
340 million  in  1960.  Under the  second, the  figure  would be more than  1,900  million 
m. tons h.c.e. (almost 1,500 million tons of crude oil). 
In both cases, the result is  also affected by our assumption that the Communist bloc 
will  be  self-sufficient.  If there is  a general increase in  international trade with  this  part 
of the  world  and  sufficient  quantities continue to  be available for export from  Eastern 
countries, imports from  the Middle East might be cut by 10 to 15%  because oil  would be 
imported from the Communist area. 
43 ENERGY OUTLOOK 
TABLE 12 
Outline world energy balance-sheet 1960-1970 -1980 
A.  - 1960 
(000,000 m. tons h.c.e.; roundedfigures) 
Area 
I. Areas qf'heavy consumption 
1.  Western Europe 
of which hard and brown coal 
oil 
of which total Community1) 
hard and brown coal 
oil 
2.  North America 
of  which hard and brown coal 
oil 
of which total United States 
hard and brown coal 
oil 
3.Japan 
of  which hard and brown coal 
oil 
Total areas of heavy consumption ( l +  2 +  3) 
II. De_veloping areas 
4.  Middle East 
of which oil 
5.  Latin America 
of  which oil 
6. Other non-Communist areas 
of which oil 
7. of which A.fi'ica 
oil 
Total developing areas (4 +  5 +  6) 
Ill.  Total ji·ee world 
IV.  Communist H'orld 
of which Soviet Union 
V. Whole \\'Orld 
Total 
requirements 
(internal 
consumption 
+bunkers) 
845 
520 
280 
445 
280 
140 
1.580 
380 
670 
1.475 
360 
615 
115 
60 
45 
2.540 
50 
40 
155 
120 
240 
90 
75 
30 
445 
2,985 
1,365 
605 
4,350 
I 
I 
Production 
545 
480 
20 
300 
260 
15 
1.440 
400 
510 
1.365 
390 
475 
60 
50 
I 
2,045  I 
350 
340 
290 
255 
200 
55 
65 
20 
I 
840  I 
2,885 
1,410 
4,295 
E;alance 
Pruduction-
total 
reguiremen• 
--300 
-- 40 
--260 
--145 
-- 20 
--125 
·-140 
+  20 
--160 
--110 
+  30 
·-140 
·- 55 
·- 10 
·- 45 
·-495 
+300 
+300 
+ 135 
+ 135 
·- 40 
·- 35 
·- 10 
·- 10 
+ 395 
·-100 
+  45 
+  45 
55 
Source <Jf .,ratistics:  L"' World Energy Supplies except for Community;. Oil  production figures are converted to h .c.e. 011  the hasis 1 ton 
of crude oil =  1.3 tons of coal. 
1)  After conversion of  hydro power according to the U 1\  formula of 0.125 kg.  h.c .e. perk  Wh. 
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Outline world energy balance-sheet 1960-1970-1980 
B.  - 1970 
('000,000 m. tons h.c.e.: rounded.figurcs) 
Total  Ralc.nce 
Area 
requirements  Production  Production- finternal  total 
con~umption  requirements  + tmnkers) 
I. Areas (~{heavy consumption 
I. Western Europe  1300  555/590  -745/--710 
of which hard and brown coal  455/490  400/435  - 55 
oil  725/690  35  -690/-655 
of which Community  745  310/335  -435/-410 
hard and brown coal  240/270  210/235  - 30/- 35 
oil  425/395  25  -400/-370 
2.  North America  2270  2080  -190 
of which hard coal forinternal requirements  515  515  -
hard coal for export  - 45  +  45 
oil  955  720  -235 
natural gas  745  745  -
of which United States  2100  1920  -180 
hard coal for internal requirements  490  490  -
hard coal for export  60  +  60 
oil  865  650  -215 
natural gas  705  680  - 25 
3.Japan  275  70  -205 
of which hard and brown coal  80  55  - 25 
oil  180  2  -180 
Total areas of  heavy consumption (I+ 2 + 3)  3845  I 
2705/2740  I 
-1140/-1105 
I I. Developing areas 
4. Middle East  95  960/925  + 865/+ 830 
of which oil  80  940/905  + 860/ +  825 (1) 
5.  Latin Arnerica  295  435  +  140 
of which oil  205  355  +  150 
6. Other non-Communist areas  400  535  +  135 
ofw·hich oil  195  325  +  130 
7. of which Aji"ica  110  320  +210 
oil  50  260  + 210 
Total developing areas (4 -t- 5 +  6)  790  I 
1930/1895  I 
+ 1140/+ 1105 
Ill. Total.fi'ce world (I + II)  4635  4535 
IV. Communist world 
of which Soviet Union  2175 
Y.  Whole H'orld  6810 
(a)  Calculated as a  remainder. This figure would be reduced by any increase in  production in  the non-C cJmmunis t a rea sand any  net 
imports from the Communist countries. 
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Outline world energy balance-sheet 1960-1970-1980 
c.- 1980 
First alternative - Low imports from Middle East 
(000,000 m. tor1s h.c.e.; roundcdjigures) 
Total 
I 
Haiance 
requirements 
Production 
.Proc uction-
Area  (internal  t)tal  consumption 
+bunkers)  requirements 
I. Areas of  heavy consumption 
I. Western Europe  1,920  945  --975 
of which hard and brown coal  l 
435  l 
oil  1,675  65  --975 
natural gas  I  200 
of which Cornmunity  1,150  560  --510 
hard and brown coal  l 
225  1 
oil  I 
1,005  50 
J 
-- 590 
natural gas  140 
2.  North America  3,170  3,145  -- 25 
of which hard coal for internal requirements  725  725  --
hard coal for export  - 175  '  175 
oil  1,255  1,055  --200 
natural gas  985  985  --
ofwhich United States  2,900  2,790  --110 
hard coal for internal requirements  695  695  --
hard coal for export  - 195  + 195 
oil  1,125  860  --265 
natural gas  910  870  -- 40 
3.Japan  540  100  --440 
of which hard and brown coal  100  55  -- 45 
oil  400  3  --395 
4. Adjustment to allow for effect of 
American coal on domestic production 
in Europe and Japan  - 60  -- 60 
Total areas of heavy consumption (1 + 2+  3 + 4) -4)  5.630  I  4.130  I 
-1.500 
II. DevelopinR areas 
5.  Middle East  190  1,385  + 1,195 
of which oil  160  1,345 (a)  + 1_185  (a) 
6.  Latin America  555  580  25 
of which oil  405  445  +  40 
7. Other non-Communist areas  690 
I 
970  + 280 
of which oil  355  640  + 285 
8.A.fi·ica  180 
I 
625  + 445 
of  which oil  75  520  + 445 
Total developing areas (5 + 6 + 7)  1_435  I  2,935  I  + 1,500 
Ill. Totalfi-ee rvorld (I + I I)  7,065  7,065 
IV. Communist world of which Soviet Union 
V. Whole world  10,900 
(a) Calculated as a remainder. See note to Table 12 B. 
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Outline world energy balance-sheet 1960 -1970 -1980 
D.- 1980 
Second alternative- High imports from Middle East 
(en  millions de tee; chijfres arrondis) 
Total  Balance 
Area 
requirements  Production-
(internal  Production 
consumption  total 
+bunkers)  requirements 
I. Areas q(heavy conswnption 
1.  Western Europe  1,920  690  -1,230 
of which hard and brown coal 
l 
300 
) 
oil  1,710  45  -1,230 
natural gas  135 
of which Community  1,150  400  -750 
hard and brown coal  l 
140 
) 
oil  1,040  30  - 750 
natural gas  120 
2.  North America  3,170  2,840  - 330 
of which hard coal for hard coal for export  725  725  -
internal requirements  - 65  +  65 
oil  1,255  860  - 395 
natural gas  985  985  -
ofwhich United States  2,900  2~550  - 350 
hard coal for internal requirements  695  695  -
hard coal for export  85  +  85 
oil  1,125  730  - 395 
natural gas  910  870  - 40 
3. Japan  540  80  - 460 
of which hard and brown coal  70  35  - 35 
oil  430  3  - 425 
Total areas of  heavy consumption (I+ 2 + 3)  5,630  I  3,610  I  -2,020 
I I. Daeloping areas 
4. Middle East  190  1,975  + 1,785 
of which oil  160  1,935 (a)  + 1,775 (a) 
5. Latin America  555  670  +  115 
of which oil  405  535  +  130 
6. Other non-Communist areas  690  810  +  120 
of which oil  355  480  +  125 
7.A.fi"ica  180  490  +  310 
of which oil  75  390  +  315 
Total developing areas (4+ 5 +6)  1,435  I  3,455  I  + 2,020 
Ill. Totalfi·ee world (  l +II)  7,065  7,065 
IV. Communist world of which Soviet Union  (3,835) 
V.  Whole world  10,900 
(a) Calculated as a remainder. See note to Table 12  B. 
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B  - Conditions of  American coal production 
The most recent trends and studies confirm and strengthen the conclusions sketched 
in  the "Outlook". While output is  likely  to rise slightly, real costs will  tend tc  fall  and 
reserves of steam coal at least will remain plentiful. 
In the pits, the potential increase in output may well be enough to offset higt er wages 
in  real terms; allowing for a slight increase in other costs, pithead prices can be expected 
to remain steady over the next fifteen years, even with an average incn~ase in production. 
As  regards  transport costs, the present trend is  towards lower rail  freight rates for 
deliveries of coal to thermal power stations, because of competition from other s :mrces of 
energy and other means of transport (coal pipelines, high-voltage power lines); th,::se lower 
rates are the result of rationalisation (full train loads etc.) and are a  practical e:;'llample  of 
the substantial cuts in  costs which have been forecast by experts for many years. There 
is  no reason why these methods should not be applied to the transport of coal for export, 
if sufficient quantities are carried with sufficient regularity. Over the next fifteen years, it 
should certainly be possible to save $1.50 on the present rate of$4.50. 
Lastly,  on  the  Atlantic  run,  the  rise  in  average  cargo capacity should  more than 
offset other factors which are liable to increase costs. 
Thus, the real cost in real terms of coal delivered to Europe in  1980 should be similar 
to the figures for 1970 i.e. $13 to 13.50 for mixed coking coal and $11  to 11.50 for 7,500 kcal. 
steam coal1). This forecast is  something like  10% lower than the figures suggested in the 
"Outlook", but will  only be fulfilled if output rises moderately and steadily. On the other 
hand, an increase of the magnitude required for the first alternative is  hardly likely to be 
achieved without any rise in  costs. Output would. in  fact, have to increase from 400 mil-
lion m.  tons h.c.e. in  1960 to 900 million (almost 1,000 million short tons) and the American 
coalmining  industry  is  unlikely  to be  able to  double its  production without temporary 
bottlenecks and higher costs. 
C  - Oil supply conditions 
Price formation  mechanisms for oil products are highly complex. Quite apart from 
having to deal with joint products, there are other factors connected with the  ndustry's 
varied structure and  institutional changes,  in  both producing and consuming ,::ountries. 
As a result, no precise forecast can be made for 1980 on the many questions here in-
volved; at best, conditional replies can be suggested allowing for the trend of  certain objec-
tive data and, more particularly, policy decisions which may or may not be  ta~ en in  due 
course. 
To limit the margin of uncertainty affecting long-term forecasts. the following points 
are better dealt with separately: 
- the trend of cost elements which should be covered by the nett realisation of crude oil; 
1)  When comparing with Community coaL it  should be borne in  minJ that American coal often ha~ a higher calorific 
value per ton. 
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the  principal  factors  likely  to  intluence  price formation  and  thus  profit  margins1). 
This sub-section is exclusively concerned with the trend in various expense categories; 
prices are dealt with in the next section. 
At any given  time, the untaxed nett realisation of oil should be sufficient to cover a 
set of expenses made up as follows: 
a)  - all expenditure on exploration and the production of crude oil, comprising: 
current operating costs; 
the expenditure on exploring and developing deposits; 
b)  production taxes; 
c)  the full cost of transport, refining and distribution; 
d)  a group of expenses comprising: 
profits  tax  in  the  countries  in  which  the head office  and all  subsidiaries are 
registered; 
dividends to shareholders. 
The above breakdown is  not quite the same as that normally used in firms' accounts 
which  show operating costs. tax and amortisation and  then work out the profit margin. 
The whole depreciation provision is  used. together with surplus profits after dividend and 
income from  foreign  loans, to finance the industry's capital expenditure. The concept of 
amortisation  raises  no  complicated  problems for operations after the  production stage 
(group c). which are analysed in accordance with the standard accounting procedure out-
lined  in  annex 4;  but  expenditure on production and exploration  has oeen included as 
such to avoid the complicated calculation of amortisation for these cost elements (group a) 
and to show clear! y the effect of their uncertain trend. 
a)  Expenditure on crude oil exploration and fJroduction 
Current operating co5;ts 
Current operating costs for crude oil vary from field to field and over a period. Taking 
figures for regions. the present average ranges from  less than 50 cents per metric ton in 
the Middle East to about 2 dollars in North Africa. 
A  fair  number of experts believe that, for a  number of reasons, average production 
costs in  the Eastern hemisphere should remain relatively steady over the  next  15  to 20 
years. 
In  the  M iddie  East,  with  its enormous proved reserves. consequent high  reserves/ 
production ratios and  characteristic production curves (very  slight  decline  in output per 
1
) The pro  lit  margin is  very difficult to determine because it  is  a joint result of the price situation on all  markets. 
which  ihelf depends  on  the  amount  of competition. and  of cost  trends.  It therefore  varies  appreciably  hoth 
over a period and from  company to company, according to size, degree of integration, breakdown of production 
and market~. In  practice, very  little  is  known concerning profit  margins and  the rresent analysis  merely seeb 
to md1cate lhe ~upply factors which may affect the trend of total expen~es over the next fifteen vear-;. 
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well  over the period under review at least wholly offset by technical advances), exploi-
tation of the main deposits seems likely to go on supplying a very large part of  the demand 
for crude. 
In  Africa,  where  deposits  are  smaller,  the  effect of lower production 011  average 
operating  costs  is  likely  to  be  negligible  because  new  discoveries  will  be opened up. 
The extension of offshore prospecting and development may  however help to raise 
costs in these regions, although the amount of the increase should be cut by rapid technical 
progress with this form of working. 
The introduction of secondary recovery processes may also increase this group of 
costs but the effect should not be great unless exploration fails to fulfil  the high hopes of 
discoveries in  these areas. In the opposite, and more likely, circumstance, the use of this 
process will be confined to fields where it can compete with primary production. 
Expenditure on exp/orinu and developing deposits 
Questions to be considered include first of all  the  trend of world reserves because, 
while  short and medium-term supply is  determined largely by existing production capac-
ity,  the  position  will  depend on  reserves  in  the  longer run. The world  distribution of 
proved reserves, which are the only ones for which semi-official figures are available (Ta-
ble 13), suggests that supplies will be much more plentiful in the Eastern than tht: Western 
Hemisphere.  However, in assessing the consequences of this disparity, account must be 
taken of the  meaning  of "proved" reserves  and the way in  which they are calculated. 
Proved  reserves  are  hydrocarbons  which  can  be  recovered from  known deposits 
under the technological and economic conditions ruling at the time of estimating. Assess-
ment of a deposit's reserves depends basically on its size, productivity per well and recove-
ry rate, which only become known as the field  is  developed and brought into prCJduction. 
Proved reserves are, therefore, revised upwards from time to time and the annual average 
increase is  more the result of revised estimates and extensions of deposits than of fresh 
discoveries. 
The constitution of proved reserves, forming  the safety margin for future  supplies, 
involves  very  substantial  capital  outlay  which  ceases  to be justified  above  a  certain 
figure, varying with the cost of  exploration in different parts of the world. 
It will,  therefore, be understood why for almost 40  years the  American oil  industry 
has  been  satisfied  with  a  fairly  low  annual  reserves/production  ratio  (from  10  to  15, 
which is sufficient for 7 to 10 years production allowing for the growth of demand), partic-
ularly as  exploration costs are very high and rising mainly for historical and institutional 
resaons. 
Table 13  also shows that, by these criteria. the reserves/production ratio is at normally 
high  in  the  Middle  East.  This can be attributed to the discovery of exception:tlly large 
and cheap reserves. Furthermore, the "proving" of 27,000 million metric tons form 1950 to 
1965 is  due less to fresh discoveries-the 7 deposits containing most of the 28,400 million 
tons of reserves recorded in  the Middle East by the end of 1964 were  discover<~d before 
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1950-than  to  higher  revised  estimates  of known and  partly  explored deposits.  These 
revised estimates.  which  arc  standard practice in  the oil  industry. have  been especially 
instrumental  in  raising  delcared  Middle  East  reserves.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore, 
that the reserves/production rat=o has been falling quickly in the Middle East for a number 
of  year~.;,  as  revised  estimates  and  new discoveries  represem only three to four times 
annual production which is rising continuously. 
7ABU:· 13 
Breakdown by areas of reserves on lst January 1965 and gross 
increase 1950-1965 
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The problem is. therefore.  ~o determine the conditions in which the necessary techni-
cal  measures  will  be taken to ensure that the  1980 reserves will  he sufficient to cover a 
given numher of years of  future production. 
It  is  here  intere'>ting  to  compare  the  reserves discovered  from  1950  to  1965  with 
those  which  must  be  found  bet ween  1965  and  1980  to guarantee a  reserves/production 
ratio ot'  i 5 to  20,  which is  roughly the  figure considered as economically sound by  the oil 
compames. 
Table 14.  relating to the free world. shmvs the reserves which must be discovered to 
meel  two dtffcrent  targets.  namely.  12  in the Lnited States, 25  in the  Middle Eaq and 
20 ciscvvhere. or 12 in the United States and ! 5 ehewhere. 
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TABLE 14 
Volume of resen:es to be discovered between 1965 and 1980 
to reach certain targets for the reserves/production ratio 
Production 
('000,000 m. tons) 
I 
1965  1980 
(1)  I 
(•) 
United States  436  660  560 
Canada  41  150  100 
Venezuela  180  220  280 
Rest of  Western Hemisphere  59  120  120 
Total Western Hemisphere  716  1150  1060 
Western Europe  21  50  30 
Africa  102  400  300 
Middle East3)  425  1035  1490 
Asia-Australia  33  90  70 
Total Eastern Hemisphere  581  1.575  1 890 
Total free world  1297  2 725  2 950 
1 J =  htgh  esttmate ot production m the mdustnahsed countnes. 
2
)  =  high estimate of production in the Middle East. 
Gross 
increase in 
reserves 
1950-1965 
(thousand 
millionm. 
6.8 
1.1 
3.-
1.5 
12.4 
0.5 
2.7 
27.-
1.7 
31.9 
443 
Targets:  Maintenance of  the following ratios between reserves and current production 
A  B 
Lnited States  12 year-;  12 years 
Middle East  25 year'  1.5  years 
Other areas  20 year'  15 years 
31 The production figures for the Middle l::ast have ueen obtained as balancing items. 
Volume to be discovered~) 
(thousand million m.  tons) 
I 
Target A  Target B 
(l)  I 
(2)  (l)  I 
(2) 
11.7  9.7  11.7  9.7 
3.6  2.2  2.9  1.7 
5.2  6.9  4.1  5.5 
2.6  2.6  2.- 2.-
23.1  21.4  20.7  18.9 
1.2  0.6  C.9  0.5 
9.5  6.7  7.5  5.2 
9.2  24.2  c.o  9.2 
1.2  0.6  C.8  0.3 
21.1  32.1  9.9  15.2 
44.2  53.5  29.9  34.1 
4! '"Volume to be discovered" means not only reserves from new discoveries but also increases arising f:·om  revised e>timaks. exten-
;;ion.s and improved recovery rates. 
For each of the above "discovery" targets, the two production alternatives discussed 
earlier in the world balance sheet have been taken into account. 
This table can be summarised as follows: 
Reserve~ to be 
discovered between 
Reserves  1965 and 1980 
discovered from  A 
I 
B 
1950 to 1965 
1  I 
2  1  I 
2 
United States  6.8  11.7  9  ~r  .J  11.7  9.7 
Rest of Western Hemisphere  5.6  11.4  11.7  9.0  9.2 
Middle East  27  9.2  24.2  0  9.2 
Rest of Eastern Hemisphere  4.9  11.9  7.9  9.2  6.0 
Total free world  44.3  44.2  53.S  29.9  34.1 
52 ASPECTS OF A  BALANCED SITUATION AROUND /980 
It will  be seen that reserves which  must be discovered by 1980 range from one and 
a half to two and a  half times the quantity discovered during the past fifteen years in the 
world  excluding the  United States and  the  Middle  East, and from  1.4  to  1.7  times the 
amount discovered during the same period in  the United States. For the Eastern Hemi-
sphere, the volume to be discovered for target A, outside the Middle East, is between 1.6 
and 2.4  times the figure for 1950  to  1965.  This multiplication factor is  roughly the same 
as  the  increase  in  oil  consumption in  the  Eastern Hemisphere from  one period  to the 
other. 
Considering  next  how maintenance of the proposed reserves/production ratios will 
affect the cost of exploration and development, a distinction must first be made between 
these two items. of which the former is  much more likely to increase than the latter.  In 
practice.  however.  it  is  often  difficult  to  isolate  research  investment  from  outlay  on 
development, as the boundary between the two activities is  ill-defined and separate esti-
mates of expenditure are not available.  As an example, however, this analysis concludes 
with  the results of an  experimental  breakdown of investment between exploration and 
development  in  the  Middle  East  where the  problem is  specially important because the 
enormous reserves discovered in the area remain largely undeveloped. 
l'\:o  accurate calculation of this kind can  be  made for the whole world but the main 
magnitudes can be worked out from the data available. 
Table  15,  covering the  period  1950-1965, gives an  estimate, for major regions, of 
sums invested in  exploration and development, the gross increase in  reserves and invest-
ment per metric ton of proved reserves.1) 
TABLE 15 
Estimated investment in exploration and development 
Figures for the period 1950-1965 
Total  Gross  Investment  increase in 
investment  reserves  per ton 
$thousand  thousand  discovered 
million  million m. tons  $ 
United States  56  6,8  8.2 
Rest of Western Hemi~phere  15,1  5.6  2.7 
Western Hemisphere  71.1  12.4  5.7 
Middle East  3.2  27  0.12 
Rest of Eastern Hemisphere  6.9  4.9  1.4 
Eastern Hemisphere  10.1  31.9  0.32 
Total free world  51,2  44.3  1.8 
World, except United States  25.2  37.5  0.67 
Investment 
per ton 
produced 
$ 
9.5 
4.9 
7.9 
0.93 
7,5 
2.3 
6.1 
3.4 
1
)  In  -;ome  CC~ses.  the  figure  obtained  by  uiviuing  investment  for exploration  and development  by  reserves  di~­
nwered Juring a given period may be significant. This would appear to be the case for the whule uf the United 
Stale'>.  but the same magnitude  may lead to mistakes in other regions. This is  so. for ex<trnplc.  fur the  Miudle 
Ea't where major revised estimates of reserves were made between  1950 and  19()5  but the deposits in  question 
were only very partially developed.  In  this case. therefore. a  calculation uistinguishing between exploration and 
development expenses is essential. 
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Investment per ton discovered clearly varies widely from region to region, from some-
thing like $8  in  the  United States to a  minimal figure in the Middle East and an average 
of  $2 for the rest of  the world. 
In  order to keep the reserves/production ratio constant when production is  rising, 
more than one fresh ton of reserves must be found for every ton extracted, with the value 
of the multiplying factor increasing when the reserves/production ratio and/or the rate of 
increase in production are rising. Over the last fifteen years, investment in exploration and 
development for every ton extracted was about $6  for the whole of the world and $3.50 
excluding the United States. 
For the future, the main factor of uncertainty is the trend of  investment in exploration 
and development in the various areas of  the world. 
If investment per ton  discovered  remains constant, the required discoveries shown 
above would reduce investment per ton produced by about $1.50 under the dearer. A  1 al-
ternative, both for the whole world without the United States and for the Eastt::rn Hemi-
sphere alone. 
If,  on the other hand, a substantial rise in investment per ton discovered is assumed 
for all  regions -$11  in  the  United States, $1  in the Middle East and $4  in the rest of the 
world-total  investment  would  be  multiplied  by  2.8  and  investment per ton  produced 
would rise by $1  for the whole world, for the world except the United States and for the 
Eastern Hemisphere. Companies' profit margins would be affected accordingly. 
These assumptions of rising unit  investments may appear to be close to the upper 
limit of the possible range, since any  estimate of future investment :in  the Middle  East 
based on a calculation which differentiates between exploration and development expen-
ses does not give quite the  same results as those quoted above. The estimate of future 
costs in the Middle East is based on two assumptions: 
maintenance of unit  investments  at  the  same  level  as during the reference period; 
unit investments increased twofold for development and  tenfold for exploration.  In 
practice, doubling unit investment for development when production curves are falling 
would mean an almost threefold increase in the number of wells in active production. 
The expert view is  that this would be impossible for the main Middle East deposits 
during the period under review. 
Total investments in  exploration and development are expressed!  per ton produced. 
As production will  expand more slowly over the coming years (6·2% and 8·4% as against 
12%), investment per ton produced: 
will be lower than during the reference period if unit investment is  maintained at the 
previous figures of 40 cents perm. ton or 30 cents perm. ton, depending on th1:: estimate 
of  production; 
will  increase very  moderately if unit investment rises by  10  cents, or 60 eents, per 
metric ton. 
A further comment is required on this point. The argument is based on the average for 
the period 1965-1980,  which is,  in  fact, characterised by a progressive fall  in the reser-
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Yes/production ratio.  It may. therefore, be helpful to consider what the position is  likely 
to be  at the end of the period. Assuming that production will continue to follow the rising 
pattern anticipated for the closing years of the period; expenditure per ton produced will 
probably be from $1  to $1.50 higher than the calculated average for the period. 
b)  Fiscal charges on production 
There have recently been a series of developments which cannot easily be summarised 
into a single trend. A number of  outstanding features may be noted, however; 
keen  competition  between  producing  countries  and  high  world  production  have 
prevented any substantial increase and have even induced some producing countries 
to accept a lower rate of tax per ton. Taxes have remained fairly steady in Venezuela. 
but  the  Middle  East  agreement  on  expensing of royalties  has  resulted  in  a  rise  of 
30  cents  per  m.  ton,  with an  increase of about $1  per ton  in  some  new  contracts; 
most new contracts reflect the  producing countries' desire to take part in  the exploi-
tation of their oil  resources, on terms and conditions which vary widely from country 
to country. 
Only a  very moderate rise in fiscal charges is to be expected over the next few years 
but any estimate of longer-term trends must take account of all  factors affecting the world 
energy market. This point will be considered later. 
c) Total cost qf"transport, re.flning lind distribution 
The expected slackening of the  growth of demand in  many parts of the world will 
reduce expansion investment  per ton  consumed, the unit  investment  being unchanged. 
This trend  will  certainly affect investment in  transport, refining and distribution, where 
Jess  self-financing  may  be  required,  as more  capital  is  available from  outside sources. 
Sea  tmnsport.  Recent  trends in  this  sector confirm the analysis in  the "Outlook". 
The  composition of the  fleet  is  changing  more  quickly  than  anticipated;  new  vessels 
coming into service are all  big. so that average tanker size is increasing and will continue to 
do so; a  rise from 27,000 tons dwt in 1964 to 38,000 tons in  1970 is expected and the trend 
will continue. 
Over the next fifteen  years, therefore. the  cost of sea transport is  likely to fall  by 
between 50 cents and $1  on average for traffic concerning the Community. 
Refining. Technical advances in the refining industry have allowed a substantial cut 
in  the  figures  quoted  in  the "Outlook'' with  no change in  capacity.  Depending on  the 
crude used, the cost per ton for topping and reforming only, lies between $3  and $4 for a 
new 4-million ton refinery (average in the Community). Further increases in unit capacity 
and continued technical progress will  save at least 50 cents over about ten years (on the 
most likely assumption that the pattern of refining will be little changed). 
Inland transport and distrihution. Similarly, advances in inland transport and increases 
in quantities distributed will  keep distribution costs steady or even allow a slight reduction. 
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In all, the cost of transport, refining and distribution may drop by $1  to $2  per metric 
ton of  crude. 
d) Overheads and profits tax 
Overheads and technical research expenses per ton should not vary much. 
Taxes on profits and distributed dividends will  largely depend on the mar<et trends 
discussed hereafter but the rate per ton may well remain fairly  close to the level of the 
last few years. 
Recapitulation.  On the  basis  of the foregoing analysis  of the various elements of 
expenditure, the overall position per ton of crude used can now be summarised  It can be 
concluded  with  some  certainty  that  items  accounting  for  more than  two thirds  of the 
untaxed  realisation· on crude  delivered  to  consumers  in  the Community  will  show  no 
change or will  be reduced.  Against this, uncertainty regarding geological conditions may 
lead to  an increase in  investment per ton produced, affecting margins by an amount of 
$2 to $3 by the end of the period. 
Policies and market conditions are other sources of uncertainty which are discussed 
in the next section. 
Section 4 
Prices and market balance 
In  proceeding from  this  cost  analysis  to a  price  analysis.  two  rm~jor ob•.tacles are 
encountered: 
production costs vary widely from region to region; 
with the relatively small number of producers there may be opportunities for exploiting 
monopolistic positions, with a wide margin between costs and prices. 
No attempt will  therefore  be  made  to forecast price levels fifteen  years hence  but 
merely to outline the main elements likely  to  affect the formation of prices.  In this con-
text, it is most instructive to comider price trends over the last decade. 
a)  Price trends m•er the last ten _\'C(i/'S 
For almost ten years prices of petroleum products have been falling steacily except 
on the  North  American  market.  This  movement which  has  been  particularly  marked 
in  Europe, derives from fundamental changes in  the pattern of world supplies, ~;ubstantial 
cuts in costs and intensified competition, following changes in the structure ofthe industry 
and in the world political climate. 
Lower costs are clue  partly to considerable technical advances at all  st<Jges  of the 
industry, and particularly in  sea transport and refining where bigger size has been mainly 
responsible for savings; they are clue to a  much greater extent to the opening up or enor-
mous deposits of crude which can be worked very cheaply. The Middle East i~; of course 
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primarily concerned. hut  increasing discoveries in  Africa have also played an important 
part: because or their geographical location and the fiscai advantages sometimes existing 
during  the  initi~d  stage-..  of operation, surne African deposits have  proved cheaper than 
the lVI iddle Fast as a source or supplies for Europe. 
These cost reductions would not have been reflected in  prices if sharper competition 
had  not changed the structure of the industry. The Middle East's extraordinary oil wealth 
had. of course. been known for many years hut had been very strictly controlled by a few 
big companies.  During the fifties,  therefore. the European price structure was still geared 
to supplies from the United States, when imports were really being switched to Caribbean 
and, preponderanrly. Middle Eastern sources of supply. The effects of increased competi-
tion only appeared slowly, following changes in  American and  British holdings after the 
second World War ( 1947), the entry of American independents into the  Iranian consor-
tium in  1954. the granting of concessions to more companies in  Venezuela. the develop-
ment of Community companies and the resumption of oil exports from Russia. 
Yet the very keen competition which has developed, mainly since  1958, on the mar-
kets  for  both crude  and finished  products, is  not solely due to more companies having 
entered the market; it  is  aldo, if not mainly, due to differences between the various com-
panies, chiefly as regards the relationship between reserves (or potential production) and 
outlets. Some companies have used a  very strong financial  position or, in certain cases. 
differential  rents as a  basis for  major efforts to extend their outlets or increase produc-
tion. One result has been a sharp drop in  prices on rapidly expanding markets, particularly 
in  Europe where the increase in  oil consumption was favoured by rapid economic growth 
and  very active  substitution. The second objective has produced very keen competition 
to  obtain  new  concessions,  both  in  established areas such  as  the  Middle  East,  where 
exploration is  limited by the size of existing concessions and in  new. but very promising 
regions.  such as  Africa. The producing countries which gained their independence after 
the second World War, have profited from these circumstances to increase their revenues 
and their direct holdings in  the industry when new contracts were negotiated or old ones 
revised. The consequent cut in  margins has been a major stimulus towards rationalisation 
and technical improvements designed to bring down the costs discus-;ed earlier. 
The recent and present situation is therefore characterised by: 
over-supply; 
further geographical diversification of exploration. 
The  rather  vague  but  very  common expression  ''over-supply"  in  fact  means that 
certain  fiels  could  be developed without any marked  rise  in  costs and  that their output 
could be substituted more cheaply for oil from deposits which are producing but relatively 
dear to operate. 
Again, even while the figures for Middle East reserves were rising by several thousand 
million  tons every year, fresh projects were being launched. Oil companies already ope-
rating in  the Middle East  were joined by new undertakings in exploring other territories 
and developing fields which were in some cases less remunerative. Despite the reductions 
which have taken place, current prices seem to offer scope for such activities. which are 
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sometimes encouraged  by  deliberate Government action to diversify sources of supply 
and  partly financed  by equalisation between areas  within  the  same company.  In  other 
words,  the  present level  of prices  still  ensures a  wide enough margin to attract capital 
for development outside the richest fields.  As a  result, a substantial differential profit is 
earned on Middle East oil. 
These  factors  explain  why.  despite  over-supply.  exploration  and  production  are 
continuing simultaneously in regions with very different costs. 
At the same time, the price cuts recorded over the last ten years or so can be <:.ttributed 
to a number of  factors working together: 
the  known  existence  of vast  deposits  m  the  Middle  East  which  are  very  cheap to 
operate; 
competition due  to  compames  unequal  possession  of oil  reserves  and  di~;tribution 
networks for refined products; 
emergence of the rapidly growing European market for energy, which the  e~.tablished 
suppliers. mainly of  coal, have been unable to satisfy. 
b) Prospective price trends 
What probability is there of  a further reversal of the situation? 
In orde1· to answer this question we must first consider how lasting the factors which 
have brought prices down since 1958 are likely to be. 
Future  developments  will  depend  primarily  on the  outcome of the  race  between 
increasing oil  consumption throughout the world and the growth of proved recoverable 
reserves. Supplies will  remain plentiful if fresh, cheap reserves are discovered :.m  a large 
scale over the  next fifteen years and revised estimates of Middle East  deposit~; continue 
to rise at the same rate as hitherto; but this  possibility cannot be used as a basis for an 
energy policy and it  would be wiser to assume a gradual return to a position where reser-
ves are sufficient for 20 to 25  years production. Such a ratio will  not impair future supplies 
but, by the industry's standards, will in  itself no longer be liable to intensify competition 
which will  henceforth depend more on the number of producers and the structure of the 
industry. 
Reference must also  be  made to changes in  demand over the next ten years or so. 
The replacement of coal by oil will continue in  the years to come. By about 1975, oil will 
have been adopted wherever it  can be used to advantage by the iron and steel industry, 
industry as a  whole, the household sector and transport, not only in  the Community but 
throughout the world.  It  will  also have taken the place of solid fuels in the generation of 
manufactured  gas  wherever  local  supplies  of natural  gas  are  insufficient  to cover the 
demand for gaseous fuels.1)  By  then  ..  the demand  for  oil  will  no  longer be f.rowing  as 
quickly as it  is  at present under the stimulus of substitution; expansion will be ~;lower and 
will  be governed mainly  by economic growth  and the rise  in  living standard..;.  Reverse 
1) Hydrocarbons will  also  predominate in  the production of peak gas supplies. wherever a  regular  ~.upply cannot 
be ensured by underground storage and non-continuous contracts. 
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substitution in the sectors named could only be started if prices changed radically against 
oil;  power stations are the only sector where competition is  likely to be affected fairly 
appreciably by prices. 
The main features of the energy balance-sheet for 1980 are therefore the predominance 
of petroleum products in covering demand, with a share of at least 500 both for the Com-
munity and the whole of the free world, and the very narrow margin available on other 
forms of  energy; 
by  1980, planned nuclear production should be covering from 8 to 11% of Community 
requirements. The high estimate is  35  million m.  tons h.c.e. above the lower limit and 
allows for a major scientific and technical effort; it is unlikely that much more oil could 
be saved  by  stepping  up  these efforts, since the margin for the  whole world cannot 
exceed about one hundred million m. tons h.c.e.; 
the margin on  American coal is  significant, amounting to 100  million and at most 200 
million m.  tons. This figure is small compared with an oil production running at 3.500 
million m. tons h.c.e., but much more substantial at European level, where it represents 
10  to  20S>~  of import requirements. However, if oil  prices rise. Europe will  not be the 
only customer  for  this  coal.  unless deliveries are guaranteed under firm.  long-term 
contracts negotiated well in advance: 
the  margin  on  European  coal  production  is  around  100  to  150  million  metric tons. 
at very high cost for the last twenty or so million (as pointed out on page 59, the whole 
of this margin cannot be added to the previous one); 
intensified  exploration  within  the  Community  may  reduce  the  need  for  imports. 
On the second of the two alternatives considered. half of all  the oil  produced by the 
free world and almost 90o/r of supplies to the world oil market come from the Middle East. 
The  shares for  the  first  alternative  (two-fifths  and  four-fifths)  are  lower but  still  very 
substantial. The dominance of a few countries in  this part of the world. together with the 
relatively  small  number of companies  in  the market-even though they vary greatly as 
regards reserves, distribution networks and financial resources in general-certainly does 
not favour the spontaneous maintenance of competitive conditions which would ensure a 
price trend not very different from that of costs. 
A  well-balanced situation in world energy with prices moving in  the same direction 
as  costs  must therefore be  sought through a  continuous series of both institutional and 
policy  measures  and  directed  to  points  in  the  market  liable  to  be  upset  by disturbing 
factors. 
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In general, the preceding analysis confirms, and even strengthens in certain respects, 
the conclusions set out in the "Outlook" for the period reviewed. Despite rapidly growing 
requirements,  both  within  the  Community and  elsewhere,  plentiful  supplies of energy 
products (oil  and  coal) throughout the world and keen competition between companies 
supplying the market should  in  the  next five to ten years  prevent the  untaxed price of 
imported energy from rising much above the present level unless unforeseen snags arise. 
As the gap widens between the cost of Community coal and the price of competing prod-
ucts. the Community coal industry will  have growing difficulty in  disposing of its output 
unless  fresh  measures  are  taken. The longer-term prospects are more uncertain; as the 
time  limit  is  pushed further into the future, our knowledge and information become less 
reliable and complications appear regarding the trend of the energy market itself. There 
are  a  number  of potential  sources  of cost  increases,  particularly  in  connection  with 
exploration  for  oil;  with  imports  playing  a  growing  part,  maintenance  of the  present 
price/cost  relationship  will  largely depend on the energy and general economic policies 
of the Community and the world in general. 
At least half of the Community's requirements will be covered by imports and certain 
risks affecting oil  supplies cannot be wholly disregarded.  First, certain producing regions 
may be affected  by  political  unrest leading to the  partial or total stoppage of deliveries; 
again, producers may put up prices artificially, a development which is  rendered less un-
likely by the fact that half of all  supplies for the world, excluding the Communist coun-
tries  will  consist of oil  obtained from a few parts of the globe with widely differing costs 
and marketed by a limited number of companies. 
l mmediate consideration should therefore be given to ways and means of reducing 
the  future  risk  to  Community  supplies  as  regards  both quantity and. more  important, 
prices. The exact pattern of such measures cannot be fixed once and for all  because their 
cost depends on a  number of geological  and economic imponderables: it  will  therefore 
need  to be  reviewed from  time to time with the systematic aim of finding  the cheapest 
form of insurance against future risks without any loss of  effectiveness. 
The chief means of action are an increase in  stocks, a permanent increase in output 
from the most reliable sources, continuously available production capacity and sufficient 
diversification of sources to spread the risk. 
These measures are not equally easy to apply or equally effective for all  sources of 
energy,  as  appears  from  a  number  of documents  recently  issued  by the  Community 
institutions. 
Coal production1)  might be  kept above the quantity that can be marketed economi-
cally; but. as no substantial increase in  the price of imported products is  likely over the 
next few years. current difficulties in  disposing of Community coal will probably become 
worse.  Output cannot, in  any case, be maintained at the present level:  production cut-
backs and pit closures have already been approved or are planned in all member countries. 
1)  Cf. High Authority memorandum on coal production targets for 1970 and coal policy. 
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But for an increase in Government  financial aid, the reduction would have to be very
substantial; over the next few years, therefore, consideration should be given to cutting
back production  and capacities in conjunction  with more effective  measures to promote
sales. In the coalmining areas, the number of men working in the pits will decline quickly,
an{ in some cases very quickly.  every year, as the combined  result of higher productivity
antl lower output. The rate at which production declines  will therefore largely  depend on
the speed at which effective  meutsures  are taken to retrain redundant  workers  anU redevelop
the economies of the areas affected.
As fresh information on long-term prospects  becomes available in a few years'time,
coal production  trends will have to be reviewed, as zrlso the part that coal imports from
third countries  can play in the various consumer sector of the Community.
In the nuclear sectorl), consideration might be given to Covernment incentives for
electricity  producers to ensure that the present target for nuclear power production  in
1980 is reached or even exceeded  and to encourage tiesh exploration  for uranium ore;
a suitable storage  policy should also be considereC.
In the case of oil2), temporary  crises could be met by the constitution  of sufficient
stocks but this would not be a complete or adequate  solution for a prolonged crisis. A
partial answer to this problem might be to keep some production  capacity  constantly
available for immediate use if certain supplies  were seriously disrupted and at the same
time to diversify  sources of supply enough  to spread  the ri.sk more widely. Arising from the
last point, consideration might be given to an economically-justified  expansion of Com-
munity production, and particularly  to more intensive exploration for hydrocarbons  within
the Community,  in areas with the most promising geological  structure. At the same time,
Community  companies  might be encouraged to step up exploration in other parts of the
world.
It must be emphasized, however, that oil is a world market commodity and important
fbr both producing countries and the industrialised countries which are their customers;
such measures will therefore only be effective if applied within an the overall of interna-
tional economic relations  and if sufficient competition  can be maintained between the
companies operating on the oil market. All these questions will have to be examined
with countries outside the Community,  which face the same problems, with the aim of
context harmonizing  the objectives  and the appropriate means of action.
r) Ct. First indicative programme tbr the European  Atomic  Energy Community.
2) Cf. The Commission's  t'irst note to the Council on Community policy lbr oil and natural  gas.
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